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PROVIDING JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR  
DECISIONS BY POLITICAL TRUSTEES 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Chaos in Iraq, controversy over U.S. unilateralism, and skepticism 
about “nationbuilding” have unsettled ground rules for international inter-
vention.  Human rights violations, failed states, refugee crises, and interna-
tional terrorism have combined to put the international community in the 
position of exercising a measure of sovereignty over formerly independent 
territories, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  This 
practice of ad-hoc international intervention is likely to continue. 
Such political trustees1 exercise temporary legislative, executive and 
judicial authority; yet in no case to date have they structured their judicial 
authority so as to provide for judicial review of either the constitutional va-
riety, or of the administrative variety.2  It does not appear that any legal in-
stitution presently has the power to review decisions or actions by political 
trustees such as the United National Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (“UNMIK”).3  Unless the legislature or courts of a U.N. member 
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 * Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology.  This article grows out of the author's extensive involvement in Kosovo, where he has been ex-
posed to the practical realities of impaired internal legitimacy of an unaccountable U.N.-administered 
political trusteeship, and has been involved in opposing national-court litigation over political trustee 
decisions.  The author appreciates suggestions on earlier drafts by his colleagues Harold J. Krent, and 
Margaret G. Stewart. 
 1. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT'L 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385, 389 (2003) (defining political trustee as one or more states or international 
organizations exercising sovereignty over foreign territory). 
 2. As used in this article, "constitutional review" refers to the review of decisions by the highest 
authority of the political trusteeship to ensure compliance with the terms of its charter.  "Administrative 
review" refers to the review of decisions by lower level authorities of the political trusteeship to ensure 
compliance with legislative acts.  "Constitutional review" decisions bind the highest-level authority and 
can be overturned only by the body that originally created the political trusteeship in the first place, 
such as the U.N. Security Council.  In contrast, "Administrative review" decisions can be overturned by 
the highest level legislative authority. 
 3. The International Court of Justice lacks clear authority to review decisions by the United Na-
tions Security Council. Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Counsel, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1996). 
But some commentators suggest that some limited forms of judicial review by the Security Council in 
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state ignores U.N. immunity and subjects U.N. officials to jurisdiction of its 
courts,4 or unless a political trustee waives immunity for cases presented to 
specialized review tribunals,5 judicial review is unavailable in the political 
trustee context. 
The failure to provide at least for administrative review is undesirable 
for two reasons: its absence increases the likelihood of litigation in national 
courts to review decisions by political trustees, and such national litigation 
represents a far greater potential threat to effective political trusteeship than 
review in specialized tribunals linked to the trusteeship; and its absence un-
dercuts international and internal legitimacy of political trusteeships be-
cause it puts the political trusteeship outside the bounds of a “rule of law.” 
This article explains that political trustees can structure judicial review 
so as to avoid interference with the core prerogatives of a trustee to act 
quickly and decisively; that models for judicial review in the English, U.S. 
and Western European civil law systems provide valuable insights in de-
signing mechanisms of judicial review as a part of political trusteeships; 
 
the International Court of Justice exist.  See id. at 39; see also Jonathan A. Frank, A Return to Lockerbie 
and the Montreal Convention in the Wake of the September 11th Terrorist Attacks: Ramifications of 
Past Security Council and International Court of Justice Action, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 532, 
539–41 (2002) (reviewing arguments for and against ICJ review of Security Council decisions, in light 
of different roles played by the two institutions). 
The courts of the provisional institutions of Kosovo do not have authority to review U.N. decisions 
or actions, although they are explicitly given authority to review decisions of other provisional 
government institutions.  Section 9.4.2 of the Constitutional framework empowers the local courts to 
review decisions by institutions of the PISG.  As the following sentences explain, however, that power 
does not extend to review of decisions by UNMIK and the other international institutions.  UNMIK 
Regulation 2001/9, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001) (structuring the constitutional framework), 
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm [hereinafter "constitutional 
framework"].  Before these courts were established and empowered by the constitutional framework 
regulation, UNMIK, through an earlier regulation, has conferred immunity on its agents.  UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/47 § 1, UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Aug. 18, 2000) (defining immunity of NATO Kosovo 
Force ("KFOR") and UNMIK and their personnel), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/2000/re2000.47.htm.  Section 3.1 of Regulation 1000/47 makes UNMIK immune "from any 
legal process;" section 3.2 immunizes senior officers of UNMIK from "local jurisdiction in respect of 
any civil or criminal act performed or committed by them in the territory of Kosovo;" section 3.3 
immunizes other UNMIK personnel from "legal process in respect of words spoken and all acts 
performed by them in their official capacity;" section 2 confers similar immunities on KFOR and its 
personnel; section 4 similarly immunizes KFOR and UNMIK contractors. Id. §§ 2–4.  UNMIK 
provided for up to 72 hours detention of otherwise immune UNMIK personnel pending decision by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General ("SRSG") on a request for waiver of immunity with 
respect to the detainee.  UNMIK Administrative Direction 2002/18 § 1.2, UNMIK/DIR/2002/18 (Sept. 
9, 2002), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/admdirect/2002/ade2002_18.pdf.  There 
is no basis to infer repeal of this earlier immunity from the constitutional framework document. 
 4. See infra Part III.A.2.a (discussing national-court treatment of U.N. immunity). 
 5. See UNMIK Regulation 2002/13, UNMIK/REG/2002/13 (June 13, 2002) (establishing Special 
Chamber of Kosovo Supreme Court to review decisions by privatization agency), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2002/RE2002_13.pdf. 
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and that the military occupation and martial law concepts are incomplete 
because they make certain assumptions about the relationship between civil 
and military authority which are not satisfied in modern political trustee-
ships. 
This article concludes with a proposal for carefully circumscribed 
power for judicial review of the administrative variety, which could be 
added to the legal frameworks for ongoing political trusteeships such as 
those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and which should be made 
part of the mandate for any new political trusteeships in the future. 
New solutions to new problems are easier to understand if they are 
explicitly linked to conceptual frameworks that already exist.  Because of 
that, this article consistently uses analogies to American administrative law, 
particularly to the functions performed by major components of the Ameri-
can Administrative Procedure Act.6  Despite this reference to American 
administrative law, it is important to understand that this article does not 
assume—and that no one should assume—a legal framework for review of 
international political trustees that is the same as the American constitu-
tional framework.  The political history of major legal and governmental 
institutions in the United States is unique and entirely unlikely to be repli-
cated in the international setting.  Moreover, one of the greatest difficulties 
in designing international institutions is that most—if not all—“hard law”7 
is state based, and legal mechanisms at the international level must grapple 
with the absence of treaty-based legislative institutions at the international 
level to serve as a source of international governmental power.  Neverthe-
less, the analogies can be useful.  The only place where they clearly do not 
work is with respect to the existence, jurisdiction, and functioning of a re-
viewing institution; there is no “Article III” judiciary at the international 
level. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL TRUSTEESHIPS 
Since the termination of the United Nations Trusteeship system in 
1999,8 the international community has established political trusteeships in 
 
 6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–703 (2000). 
 7. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1823, 1879–80 (2002).  Guzman distinguishes international law through usage of two terms, "hard law" 
and "soft law."  See id.  The former category is shaped through treaties and customs; the latter category 
refers to promises falling short of treaties, such as nonbinding treaties, joint declarations, or final com-
muniqués. Id. 
 8. The last trust territory, the island of Palau, achieved independence in that year.  Brian Deiwert, 
A New Trusteeship for World Peace and Security: Can an Old League of Nations Idea Be Applied to a 
Twenty-first Century Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771, 779 (2004) (noting that trusteeship in 
Palau was terminated in December, 1994). 
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five cases: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  Each of 
these trusteeships has been different from others, especially in the theoreti-
cal allocation of sovereignty between international institutions of civil ad-
ministration and indigenous institutions.  They also have differed in 
whether they drew their basic authority from a United Nations Security 
Council resolution or from the principles of military occupation under cus-
tomary international law.  Nevertheless, they have shared two characteris-
tics.  In all five cases, the international authorities exercised ultimate execu-
tive and legislative power.  In none of the five cases has any general 
mechanism for judicial review been provided. 
A. United Nations in Bosnia 
The political trusteeship in Bosnia was the first of the modern political 
trusteeships.  Established under U.N. Security Council authority ending a 
vicious inter-ethnic conflict attendant to the breakup of Yugoslavia,9 the 
political trusteeship in Bosnia initially blurred the allocation of authority 
among international institutions,10 pre-existing local institutions established 
when Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia thus triggering the 
conflict, and new local institutions established by a “constitution”11 negoti-
ated in the Dayton Accords12 and imposed by the United Nations.13 
 
 9. See generally RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1998) (discussing the Bosnia negotia-
tions). 
 10. Continued involvement by the international community in the exercise of sovereignty in Bos-
nia was addressed by various provisions of the constitution and more specifically in Annex 10.  Dayton 
Peace Accords, opened for signature Nov. 21, 1995, U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Vol. 7, Supplement 
No. 1, at Annex 10 [hereinafter "Dayton Accords"].  In Annex 10, the signatories to the Dayton agree-
ments requested the designation of a High Representative of the United Nations. Id. at art. I, para. 2.  In 
Article II, the high representative was authorized to monitor implementation of the peace agreement, 
"[m]aintain close contact with the Parties to promote their full compliance," coordinate the activities of 
the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia, while respecting their autonomy to facilitate, as the 
High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civil-
ian implementation, participate in meetings of donor organizations, and report to the United Nations, 
the European Union, the United States, the Russian Federation and other interested governments, par-
ties, and organizations." Id. at art. II, para. 1. 
 11. Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords was entitled "Constitution of Bosnian Herzegovina."  Id. at 
Annex 4.  It contained articles defining the responsibilities between the "entities"—Republika Srpska 
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Id. at art. III.  The Constitution also established a par-
liamentary assembly, a presidency, a constitutional court, and a central bank.  Id. at art. IV–VII.  Article 
I, Paragraph 1 provided, "[t]he Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which shall 
henceforth be 'Bosnia and Herzegovina,' shall continue its legal existence under international law as a 
state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein and with its present internationally recog-
nized borders.  It shall remain a member state of the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzego-
vina maintain or apply for membership in organizations within the United Nations systems and other 
international organizations."  Id. at art. 1, para. 1.  Annex 4 was separately signed by the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republic of Srpska.  The Day-
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Over time, the local institutions proved largely dysfunctional, and the 
international authorities took on most of the attributes of sovereignty, in-
cluding at least the exercise of ultimate executive and legislative author-
ity.14 
No aspect of the machinery for international trusteeship in Bosnia 
provides for judicial review of decisions by the international trustee, al-
 
ton Accords included a side letter from the delegation of the Republic of Srpska requesting that the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "be the guarantor of the obligations taken by Republic of Srpska in the 
peace process."  Id. 
 12. The Dayton Peace Agreement was initialed at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, 
Ohio on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.  See HOLBROOKE, supra note 
9, at 309; Dayton Accords, supra note 10, at Annex 10.  The agreement was signed by the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  It explicitly 
noted the agreement of August 29, 1995, which authorized the delegation of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to sign, on behalf of the Republic of Srpska, the parts of the peace plan concerning it, with 
the obligation to implement the agreement that had been reached strictly and consequentially.  Dayton 
Accords, supra note 10, at preamble. Article V of the General Framework Agreement explicitly en-
dorsed Annex 4. 
 13. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1031 embraced the Dayton Accords. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. 
SCOR, 3607th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (1995).  Explicitly acting under Chapter VII of the 
charter, the Security Council, "welcome[d] and support[ed] the Peace Agreement and call[ed] upon the 
parties to fulfil in good faith the commitments entered into in that Agreement."  Id. at para. 1. 
 14. In 1997, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in Bonn.  In the conclusions of that 
conference, the Peace Implementation Council welcomed the High Representative's intention to use his 
final authority regarding interpretation of civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords by making 
binding decisions, a power found only implicitly in Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords.  See Office of the 
High Representative, Decision Amending the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, preamble (April 2, 2003), available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp (referring to au-
thority derived from conclusions of the peace implementation conference).  In early 2003, the Office of 
the High Representative published a "Mission Implementation Plan," setting forth a detailed plan for 
further progress in Bosnia.  Office of the High Representative, OHR Mission Implementation Plan (Jan. 
30, 2003), available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/ohr-mip/default.asp?content_id=29145.  Security 
Council Resolution 1112, adopted on June 12, 1997, welcomed conclusions of the ministerial meeting 
of the steering board of the Peace Implementation Council held in Sintra, Portugal on May 30, 1997 and 
reaffirmed, "that the High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding the interpretation of 
Annex 10 on civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement and that in case of dispute he may give 
his interpretation and make his recommendations."  S.C. Res. 1112, U.N. SCOR, 3787th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1112 (1997).  The Sintra Declaration reported that the steering board unanimously agreed 
that all the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were failing to live up fully to their obligations under 
the Dayton Accords and found this "unacceptable."  Office of the High Representative, Peace Imple-
mentation Council Sintra Declaration, para. 5 (May 30, 1997), available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5180.  It further concluded, "[t]he main responsibility for 
the future of the country rests with the elected and constitutional representatives of the country.  The 
help they will receive from the international community will be dependent upon the commitment they 
demonstrate to the Peace Agreement."  Id. para. 8.  By May 2003, the High Representative had made a 
number of formal decisions, some of which were styled as "enacting the decision," or "enacting the 
law." See Decision Amending the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra 
(linking full text of decisions).  See generally Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European 
Raj, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 60 (2003) (providing analysis and critique of continuing exercise of sovereignty 
power by High Representative). 
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though a “constitutional court” was part of the machinery of the imposed 
constitution with theoretical power to review decisions by local authori-
ties.15 
B. UNMIK in Kosovo 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 put the United Nations in the 
position, for the first time, of exercising sovereignty and running a coun-
try.16  Resolution 1244, and subsequent implementing documents issued by 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, established the U.N. Mission 
in Kosovo (“UNMIK”)17 as a political trustee,18 exercising sovereignty on 
behalf of the people of Kosovo, with a reversionary interest in the state of 
Yugoslavia.19  Under this arrangement, UNMIK exercises legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial functions without differentiating them very clearly.20  
These governmental powers continue even after elections were held and lo-
cal judges, legislators, and ministers took office under the “constitutional 
framework.”21 
With one limited exception, no mechanism exists for judicial review 
of UNMIK decisions.  While the constitutional framework explicitly em-
powers local courts to review decisions of the provisional local institu-
tions,22 the local courts lack the power to review UNMIK decisions,23 and 
 
 15. Dayton Accords, supra note 10, at Annex 4, art. VI, para. 3(a) (granting jurisdiction to hear 
disputes between or among local institutions, but excluding international institutions). 
 16. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) [hereinafter 
"S.C. Res. 1244"] (authorizing Secretary General to establish civil administration for Kosovo). 
 17. Id. at 6 (authorizing appointment of Special Representative of Secretary General to head civil 
administration). 
 18. This article uses the terms "trust" and "political trustee" in the sense of an entity that exercises 
sovereignty on behalf of another, rather than in the formal sense that the term "trust territory" is used in 
Chapter 12 of the U.N. Charter.  See generally Perritt, supra note 1, at 389; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Stabi-
lizing Kosovo: Enterprise Formation and Financial Markets, 2 J. GLOBAL FIN. MARKETS 28 (2001) 
(explaining "trustee-occupant" concept as defining UNMIK's role). 
 19. Perritt, supra note 18. 
 20. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 16, at 3 (delineating powers and responsibilities of civil admini-
stration). 
 21. Constitutional Framework, supra note 3. 
 22. Id. § 9.4.2 (explicitly conferring right to judicial review of decisions by provisional govern-
ment). 
 23. In UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 at section 3, the SRSG declared that "UNMIK, its property, 
funds and assets shall be immune from any legal process."  See UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 §§ 1–3 
(defining "UNMIK" to mean the "international civil presence established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1244 . . . integrating the Interim Civil Administration (United Nations), Humanitarian Af-
fairs (UNHCR), Institution-building (OSCE), and Reconstruction (EU) components"). 
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no other judicial body has the power to do so.24  Only the Kosovo Om-
budsperson, set up under the constitutional framework,25 and the U.N. In-
spector General26 exercise power to inquire into and investigate allegations 
of UNMIK misbehavior or abuse of power.  The Claims Commissions en-
visioned under Section 7 of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 had not been es-
tablished by either UNMIK or KFOR as of December 4, 2004.27 
Local government institutions in Kosovo, the so-called “Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government” (“PISG”), enjoy governmental compe-
tence in certain areas defined by the SRSG in the Constitutional Frame-
work.28  But even in those areas, PISG decisions are subject to veto by the 
SRSG.29  The PISG is headed by an elected assembly and thus enjoys a 
measure of local political accountability.  Decisions by the PISG and its 
subordinate bodies are subject to judicial review in the courts of Kosovo.30  
A Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court on Constitutional 
Framework Matters can decide disputes among local government institu-
tions and can determine claims that PISG legislation violates the constitu-
tional framework.31  This judicial review authority does not extend to 
UNMIK decisions.  The SRSG retains power to “tak[e] appropriate meas-
ures” whenever he determines that the actions of the SRSG are incompati-
ble with Security Council Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional Frame-
work.32 
 
 24. See generally Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in 
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 103 (2002) (criticizing the breadth of immunity 
granted to UNMIK personnel and characterizing Ombudsperson as ineffective because of lack of en-
forcement power). 
 25. See UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 § 10.3; UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, UNMIK/REG/2000/38 
(June 30, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re2000_38.htm. 
 26. Formally the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services, available at http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/oios/. 
 27. Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 1, On the Compatibility with Recog-
nized International Standards of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities 
of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo (18 August 2000) and on the Implementaiton of 
the Above Regulation (Apr. 26, 2001) [hereinafter "Special Report No. 1"], available at 
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/pdf/sr1.pdf. 
 28. See UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 § 5.1. 
 29. Laws adopted by the Assembly do not become effective until promulgated by the SRSG. Id. 
§§ 9.1.44–.45. The SRSG has power to dissolve the Assembly. Id. § 8.1. 
 30. Id. §§ 9.4.1–.2 ("Each person claiming to have been directly and adversely affected by a deci-
sion of the Government or an executive agency under the responsibility of the Government shall have 
the right to judicial review of the legality of that decision after exhausting all avenues for administrative 
review."). 
 31. Id. § 9.4.11. 
 32. Id. § 12. 
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The only concrete mechanism for judicial review of decisions by the 
political trustee is the Special Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions by the privatization 
agency.33 
C. United Nations in East Timor 
East Timor, like Kosovo, put the United Nations in the position of ac-
tually serving as the political trustee.34  In East Timor, sovereignty was held 
by the U.N. trustee as local institutions were designed and developed.  Sov-
ereignty then devolved to those institutions in a series of steps, concluding 
with continued United Nations involvement to provide support to the new 
institutions.35 
 
 33. On June 13, 2002, the SRSG established the Kosovo Trust Agency ("KTA" or "the Agency") 
explicitly citing authority under Resolution 1244 and UNMIK Regulation 1999/1.  UNMIK Regulation 
2002/12, UNMIK/REG/2002/12 (June 13, 2002), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/ 
2002/RE2002_12.pdf.  The KTA was established as an independent body, possessing "full juridical 
personality," with the capacity to contract, acquire, hold and dispose of property and to sue and be sued 
in its own name.  Id. §1.  KTA reports through the reconstruction component of the civil administration.  
Id. § 12.3.  KTA was authorized to administer publicly-owned and socially-owned enterprises ("SOEs") 
and related assets within the context of Section 8.1 (q) of the Constitutional Framework. Id. § 2.1.  See 
also id. § 30 (granting Special Chamber "exclusive jurisdiction for all suits against the [KTA]"). 
 34. East Timor has a long history with political trusteeship.  In 1960, the United Nations General 
Assembly added East Timor to its list of non-self-governing territories, marking the beginning of a tran-
sition from governance by Portugal.  In 1974, Portugal attempted to establish a provisional government 
and a popular assembly to determine the status of East Timor.  "Civil war broke out between those who 
favored independence and those who advocated integration with Indonesia.  Unable to control the situa-
tion, Portugal withdrew.  Indonesia intervened militarily and integrated East Timor [into its territory].  
The United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the Security Council and the General 
Assembly called for Indonesia's withdrawal."  United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
("UNMISET"), East Timor – UNMISET - Background [hereinafter "UNMISET Background"], avail-
able at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 35. In 1999 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1246 authorized the establishment of the United 
Nations Mission in East Timor ("UNAMET") to oversee a transition period during which the East 
Timorese people could decide their status.  S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 4013th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1246 (1999).  After continued violence, the government of Indonesia accepted assistance from 
the international community.  Security Council Resolution 1264 authorized a multinational force 
("INTERFET") "to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carry-
ing out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance."  Id.  This resolution 
was followed by Security Council Resolution 1272, which established the U.N. Transitional Admini-
stration in East Timor ("UNTAET").  See UNMISET Background, supra note 34. (establishing 
UNTAET as "an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the admini-
stration of East Timor during its transition to independence.  Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to 
provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an ef-
fective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordina-
tion and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation 
and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the estab-
lishment of conditions for sustainable development.")  Which created a revised U.N. mission, the 
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor ("UNMISET"), designed to provide assistance to 
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During the period of international administration no mechanism for 
judicial review existed. 
D. Civil Administration in Afghanistan 
Post-war36 arrangements in Afghanistan gave U.N. authorities less au-
thority than in Kosovo and East Timor, but nevertheless exemplify a politi-
cal trusteeship where the trustee responsibilities are divided between the 
U.N. and indigenous institutions.  The Bonn Agreement,37 negotiated by 
 
governmental administrative structures, interim law enforcement and public security, assistance in de-
veloping the East Timor police service, and otherwise to support the country's internal and external se-
curity.  S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. SCOR, 4534th mtg., U.N.Doc. S/RES/1410 (2002). 
 36. In October 2001, an ad-hoc coalition of forces, dominated by the United States, attacked Af-
ghanistan, with the explicit objective of displacing the Taliban, the then government.  The military op-
erations were justified as an exercise of the privilege of self-defense by the United States, and otherwise 
legitimate to end the Taliban's threat to international peace and security.  The post-September 11th Se-
curity Council Resolutions S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001), S.C. 
Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, U.N. SCOR, 4415th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001), S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. 
SCOR, 4434th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001), and S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 4443rd mtg., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001) [hereinafter "S.C. Res. 1386"], did not explicitly approve use of force to 
depose the Taliban government of Afghanistan.  The closest to verbal approval is language in the pre-
amble to Security Council Resolution 1386: "Supporting international efforts to root out terrorism, in 
keeping with the Charter of the United Nations . . . ," S.C. Res. 1386, supra, at preamble, and "Au-
thoriz[ing] the Member States participating in the International Security Assistance Force to take all 
necessary measures to fulfil its mandate."  S.C. Res. 1386, supra, at para. 3 (emphasis in original). 
 37. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (2001) [hereinafter Bonn 
Agreement].  The Bonn Agreement established an interim authority to be "the repository of Afghan 
sovereignty," id. at I(3), and called for an international security force to support it.  Id. at Annex I, para. 
3.  The interim administration is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state, and has 
the power "to issue decrees for the peace, order and good government of Afghanistan."  Id. at III(C)(1).  
Part II of the Bonn Agreement makes applicable the 1964 Constitution, insofar as not inconsistent with 
the terms of the Bonn Agreement, and "existing laws and regulations, to the extent that they are not in-
consistent with this agreement or with international legal obligations to which Afghanistan is a party, or 
with those applicable provisions contained in the Constitution of 1964, provided that the Interim Au-
thority shall have the power to repeal or amend those laws and regulations."  Id. at II (1)(ii).  The in-
terim authority is to be succeeded by a "Transitional Authority" established by an "Emergency Loya 
Jirga" to be convened by the former King of Afghanistan.  Id. at I(4), I(5).  The chairman, vice chair-
man, and other members of the interim administration were selected by participants in the "UN talks on 
Afghanistan," on the basis of professional competence, personal integrity, ethnic, geographic, and reli-
gious balance. Id. at III(A)(3).  The Emergency Loya Jirga was to be established by a Special Independ-
ent Commission, comprising twenty-one members "selected from lists of candidates submitted by par-
ticipants in the UN talks on Afghanistan . . . as well as Afghan professional and civil society groups."  
Id. at IV(1).  The United Nations was charged with assisting with the establishment and the functioning 
of the commission.  Id. at IV (1).  A Loya Jirga "is a forum unique to Afghanistan in which, tradition-
ally, tribal elders . . . have come together to settle affairs of the nation or rally behind a cause.  The 
phrase loya jirga is Pashto and means 'grand council.'"  Q & A: What is a Loya Jirga, BBC NEWS 
ONLINE, July 1, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1782079.stm. 
The emergency loya jirga is to decide on "a broad-based transitional administration, to lead Af-
ghanistan until such time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elec-
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representatives of Afghani interests and a representative of the U.N. Secre-
tary General, outlined the details of the trusteeship.  Pursuant to this 
agreement, the United Nations Security Council established the United Na-
tions Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on March 18, 2002.38  
UNAMA was authorized to promote national reconciliation and to fulfill 
the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, 
39
 including those related to human rights, the rule of law, and gender is-
sues.  UNAMA was also authorized to manage all U.N. humanitarian relief, 
recovery, and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan “in coordination with 
the Afghan Administration.” 40 
In Afghanistan, the role of the United Nations is limited. The Special 
Representative of the Secretary General “shall monitor and assist in the im-
plementation of” the Bonn Agreement41 and 
shall advise the Interim Authority in establishing a politically neutral en-
vironment conducive to the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga in free 
and fair conditions.  The United Nations shall pay special attention to the 
conduct of those bodies and administrative departments which could di-
 
tions to be held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga."  
Bonn Agreement, supra, at I(4).  The Bonn Agreement further provides that a Constitutional Loya Jirga 
is to be convened within eighteen months after the establishment of the Transitional Authority.  Id. at 
I(6)  This loya jirga is to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan based on work by a constitutional 
commission established by the Transitional Administration. Id.at I(6). 
 38. Resolution 1401 established UNAMA for an initial period of one year, with a mandate and 
structure specified by the Secretary General in a report of March 18, 2002. S.C. Res. 1401, U.N. SCOR, 
4501st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1401 (2002). 
 39. The Secretary General's report to the Security Council summarizes the results of the Bonn 
Conference and proposed a structure for the United Nations presence in Afghanistan in accordance with 
U.N. responsibilities under the Bonn Agreement.  See The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications 
for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 
Agenda item  43, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/56/875-S/2002/278 (2002). 
 40. Id. (Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 1401 gives UNAMA the powers recom-
mended in the Secretary General's Report).  Decisions to develop concepts for nation rebuilding in Af-
ghanistan with respect to post-war Afghanistan were, no doubt, informed by the deliberation of a 
"Committee of Experts," convened in November, 2001, by Michael Scharf and Paul Williams.  See Mi-
chael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of Experts on Nation Rebuilding in Af-
ghanistan, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 709, 709 (2002).  Drawing on experience in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone and East Timor, the Committee recommended an establishment of a non-chaotic and neu-
tralized state identification of appropriate governing structures and implementation of intermediate sov-
ereignty. Id. at 713–14. 
 41. Bonn Agreement, supra note 37, at Annex II, para. 2.  In an Annex, the participants in the U.N. 
talks in Afghanistan "request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing the early de-
ployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force.  This force will assist in the maintenance 
of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.  Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively 
expanded to other urban centres and other areas."  Id. at Annex I, para. 3. 
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rectly influence the convening and outcome of the Emergency Loya 
Jirga.42 
The transitional administration began work in June 2002,43 beset with 
an inability to extend its authority throughout the country and continued se-
curity problems.44  Work was progressing toward adoption of a new consti-
tution in late 2003,45 intended to be followed by national elections in June 
2004.46 
No mechanism was provided for judicial review of decisions by the 
international community.  Given the limited U.N. civil administration role, 
it might have been appropriate to provide for an international tribunal to af-
ford judicial review of decisions by the interim and transitional Afghani in-
stitutions. 
E. Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) in Iraq “[was] vested 
with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its 
objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions, including Resolution 1483, and the laws and usages of war.”47  The 
 
 42. Id. at Annex II, para. 3. In July 2002, the Secretary General reported on a successful conclu-
sion of the emergency loya jirga held from June 11–19, 2002 and reported on problems accompanying 
declining donor funding and on continuing security problems, supporting his recommendation of a lim-
ited expansion of the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul.  See The Situation in Af-
ghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, 
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda item 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/1000-S/2002/737 (2002). 
 43. The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report 
of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Agenda item 37, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/57/487-
S/2002/1173 (2002). 
 44. The Secretary General reported, however, that "[t]he Transitional Administration's attempts to 
fulfill its ambitious objectives have been stalled . . . by limitations in its ability to impose its authority 
nationwide.  The intended policy of replacing the existing provincial governors, and heads of the pro-
vincial police, military garrisons, revenue offices and civil administrations with officials drawn from 
other provinces . . . has not been realized."  Id. at para. 9.  He also reported that the most serious chal-
lenge facing Afghanistan is the lack of security, and noted that progress on establishing a national po-
lice force was necessary in that regard. Id. at paras. 11–14. 
 45. In early October, delegates were being selected to vote on the proposed constitution.  See 
Press Briefing, David Singh, UNAMA Media Relations Officer, Update on the Constitutional Process 
(Oct. 5, 2003), at http://www.unama-afg.org/news/briefing/spokesman/2003/03oct05.htm. 
 46. The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report 
of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Agenda item 37, paras. 12–14, U.N. Doc A/57/850-
S/2003/754 (2003) (reporting on progress toward constitutional loya jirga and prospects for meeting 
2004 deadline for elections). 
 47. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 1 § 1(2) (May 16, 2003), available at 
http://www.cpairaq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf 
[hereinafter "CPA Reg."] cf. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the 
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Pub. L. No. 108-106, 117 Stat. 1209, 2208 (codified at 22 
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legal framework for the United States role was ambiguous under U.S. 
law.48  The President issued no executive order establishing the CPA, and 
no statute defines it, except for the Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priation Act.49  Whether the Administrator of the CPA reported directly to 
the President or to the Secretary of Defense is unclear.50  Congressional 
 
U.S.C.A. § 2151 Note) (referring to CPA and its successors) (2003) [hereinafter "Iraq Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriation"]. 
  Sovereignty was formally transferred to the Interim Government on June 28, 2004.  A “Law of 
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” negotiated between the CPA and Iraqi 
leaders and signed March 8, 2004, provided for the transfer of power from the CPA to a “fully 
sovereign Iraqi Interim Government” that was to take power on June 30, 2004. See Law of the 
Administrations for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, Mar. 8, 2004, available at 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html. (last visited January 20, 2005). The UN Security 
Council approved the new arrangement in Security Council Resolution 1546, and the CPA disbanded 
itself in its Regulation 9. See generally CPA Reg. No. 9 (June 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609_CPAREG_9_Governing_Council_s_Dissolution.pd
f. 
 48. The duties of the CPA similarly were vague, except for a few appropriation-act requirements 
which are bizarre in their particularity, singling out opportunities for the disabled, for women, and reli-
gious discrimination as mandates for the CPA, but not otherwise addressing political trustee obligations.  
The Appropriation Act requires that the CPA work with Iraqi officials to ensure that a new Iraqi consti-
tution "preserves full rights to religious freedom and tolerance of all faiths."  Id.  It requires procure-
ment to occur under federal procurement law.  Id. at 1228.  The Act requires reports by the Secretary of 
State on efforts to encourage contributions by other countries, to encourage addressing the needs of 
people with disabilities, and to ensure that a new Iraqi constitution preserves religious freedom and tol-
erance of all religious faiths.  Id. at 1233.  The act requires that post-conflict stability activities "to the 
maximum extent practicable . . . increase the access of women to, or ownership by women of, produc-
tive assets such as land, water, agricultural inputs, credit, and property in Afghanistan and Iraq, respec-
tively; provide long-term financial assistance for education for girls and women in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, respectively; and integrate education and training programs for former combatants in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, respectively, with economic development programs to encourage the reintegration of such 
former combatants into society; and promote post-conflict stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, respec-
tively."  Id. at 1233–34. 
 49. The Act appropriates funds to the President for the "Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (in 
its capacity as an entity of the United States Government) . . . ."  Id. at 1225 (2003).  The Act extends 
certain of its requirements to "any successor United States Government entity with the same or substan-
tially the same authorities and responsibilities as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq."  Id. at 
1231 
 50. "The president made a decision to start it out with Jerry Bremer reporting to me.   The implica-
tion in the press was that he was going to report to the White House or Condi Rice.   As Condi has indi-
cated, that was not the import of the memo, that's not what the memo said, that's not what was in-
tended.   We know that that activity, as it matures, will migrate over at the Department of States.   I 
mean, that's how—where ambassadors report.  And eventually, it will arrive there at some point.   And 
that would be a decision would make at some point as these—as the task kind of moves less security 
towards more political and economic, one would think."  Press Conference, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec-
retary of Defense, Department of Defense, Press Conference with NATO Secretary-General Lord 
Robertson (Oct. 8, 2003), at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20031008-secdef0746.html; 
"Nothing changes in terms of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Department of Defense. This 
is still being led by the Pentagon . . . ." Press Briefing, Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary 
(Oct. 6, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031006-5.html#10. 
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oversight of CPA implied that some attributes of sovereignty remained 
with the United States.51 
The Administrator of the CPA determined that “[t]he CPA shall exer-
cise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective 
administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration.”52  
He declared that “[t]he CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and ju-
dicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under 
relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions . . . and the laws and usages of 
war.”53 
The CPA regulations provided no mechanism for judicial review.  The 
CPA established no mechanism to review its decisions or those of entities 
established under its authority.  The Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priation Act provided for an independent Inspector General with limited 
oversight responsibilities,54 but otherwise did nothing to afford tribunals 
within which the legality of trustee decisions could be tested.  U.N. ap-
proval of the political trusteeship in Iraq lent some support to the immunity 
arguments reviewed in Part III(A)(2).  But the dominance of the United 
States Government in the civil administration in Iraq also supported argu-
ments that political trustee decisions were reviewable under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and other statutes authorizing U.S. judicial review of 
U.S. government actions. 
III.  FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR  
JUDICIAL REVIEW POSES TWO RISKS 
The failure to provide explicitly for judicial review of political trustee-
ship decisions presents two risks to the success of those trusteeships.  It in-
creases the risk of litigation in national courts over trustee decisions, be-
cause of unpredictability of application of immunity in such a context and 
the dependence of forum non-conveniens dismissal on the availability of an 
adequate alternative forum.  It undermines the legitimacy of political trus-
teeships, regardless of whether national-court litigation occurs. 
 
 51. An appropriations rider requires the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Administrator 
of the CPA to report to the Congress on the uses of appropriated funds on a project-by-project basis.  
Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriation , supra note 47, at 1231. 
 52. CPA Reg. No. 1 § 1(1). 
 53. Id. § 1(2). 
 54. The Act establishes an Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority, appointed by 
the Secretary of Defense, who must report to the Congress on the use of appropriated funds and monitor 
and review reconstruction activities.  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, supra note 47, at 
1234.  The Inspector General also has the same duties and responsibilities as other inspectors general 
under the Inspector General Act of 1978.  Id. at 1236.  The Inspector General must report quarterly to 
the Congress on the activities of the CPA.  Id. at 1237. 
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A. Increased Risk of Litigation in National Courts Over Trustee Decisions 
Political trustees will make decisions that have winners and losers.  
They must develop new legislation, grant and deny licenses to valuable 
public privileges, such as access to electromagnetic spectrum for cell phone 
providers, award contracts to perform public services and conduct public 
works, and restructure industry.  In each of these examples someone will 
have an interest in challenging the trustee decisions.  Litigation over these 
decisions in national courts around the world would produce a web of in-
consistent decisions, could result in significant blockages to trustee opera-
tion depending on the outcome of such litigation and how national-court 
judgments are enforced, and distract trustee attention from its main work. 
Yet, such national court litigation is likely unless the framework for a 
political trusteeship includes specialized—and exclusive—mechanisms for 
judicial review.  While strong immunity arguments may be available, po-
litical trustees perform functions outside the historic ambit of diplomatic 
activities which diplomatic immunity doctrines were created to protect, and 
political trustees may not be recognized as “states,” and therefore may not 
be entitled to immunity doctrines historically developed to shield exercise 
of sovereignty.  Existence of specialized review bodies as part of—or par-
alleling—the trusteeship would considerably reduce the likelihood of such 
national court litigation because they would increase the probability of fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal. 
National court review of trustee decisions would not be comprehen-
sive; only certain plaintiffs would have standing.  Actions could be main-
tained only against defendants within the personal jurisdiction of the tribu-
nal and not immune from suit in that tribunal.  Relief would depend further 
on the availability of a cause of action, and the inapplicability of forum non 
conveniens or other comity doctrines that would avoid reaching the merits.  
Only a subset—maybe a small subset—of the controversies that might war-
rant judicial review in a comprehensive system is potentially justiciable in 
national courts.  But the subset is not null; it likely contains plaintiffs and 
defendants and claims that could result in national-court decisions. 
Two types of national court litigation are conceivable.  The first would 
involve the political trustee or its constituent units as a defendant.  The sec-
ond would involve states participating in or sponsoring the trusteeship as 
defendants.  The following sections consider each possibility.  The first is 
framed by an actual case, in which a U.S. enterprise, disappointed by the 
decisions of the privatization agency established by the political trustee in 
Kosovo, filed suit for breach of contract in state court in New York.  The 
second considers a cluster of hypothetical claims against the United States 
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Government, challenging decisions by the U.S.-established and dominated 
political trustee in Iraq. 
National court litigation is more likely when assets belonging to the 
political trustee or to persons under its control are found in the state within 
which litigation is attempted.  Absent such assets, enforcement of a na-
tional court judgment is unlikely; the political trustee can simply ignore it.  
Of course a national court judgment might be enforced by the courts of an-
other state, if it agrees with the first court’s analysis of immunity and juris-
dictional issues. 
1. Choice of law.  Several of the prerequisites for national court liti-
gation turn on the choice of law (private international law): It is widely ac-
cepted that any judicial forum should apply its own choice to law rules in 
deciding whether to apply foreign law or forum-law to various aspects of 
the controversy.55  Accordingly, the resolution of many of the issues pre-
requisite to maintenance of a national-court lawsuit over political trustee 
decisions depends on where suit is brought.  Nevertheless, some choice of 
law rules are well settled and widely applied by most national legal sys-
tems.  Immunity is determined by the law of the forum.56  Comity—the re-
spect to be given legislative, executive and judicial decisions by a foreign 
sovereign—is determined by the law of the forum, although the classifica-
tion of the decisions may depend on the law of the decisionmaker.57  Per-
sonal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the forum.58  Standing to 
bring suit, and whether a legal claim exists as to which relief can be granted 
may depend on the law of the trusteeship state or of another place, as when 
a breach of contract claim arising from a contract entered into in the trustee 
territory to be performed there.  Heavy reliance on the law of the forum for 
so many of these issues makes it difficult to predict the outcome of national 
court litigation.  Nevertheless, one can predict with a high degree of confi-
dence the arguments that will be made by the parties in such lawsuits.  The 
following sections frame those arguments and suggest how the existence of 
specialized administrative review mechanisms might affect the outcome of 
those arguments. 
 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(2) (1971) (concluding that "[t]he classi-
fication and interpretation of Conflict of Laws concepts and terms are determined in accordance with 
the law of the forum"). 
 56. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 417 (1979) (discussing core principle of The Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, and concluding that sovereignty implies that courts determine their 
own power).  But see Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1358–59 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing 
circumstances in which court applies another state's immunity rules). 
 57. Supra text accompanying note 55. 
 58. Supra text accompanying note 56. 
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2. Suits against the political trustee and its subordinate bodies.  To 
date there have not been many lawsuits in national courts challenging trus-
tee decisions.  It is unlikely that this passivity on the part of parties dis-
pleased with trustee decisions is a permanent state.  For example, in late 
2003 a New Jersey company disappointed by a decision of the privatization 
agency in Kosovo, the Kosovo Trust Agency (“KTA”), filed suit in state 
court in New York City, subsequently removed to federal court, against the 
United Nations, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, and the KTA.  The 
availability of a specialized court in Kosovo with exclusive jurisdiction 
over privatization disputes considerably strengthened the forum-non-
conveniens arguments available to the defendant KTA and to the author in 
an amicus brief prepared on behalf of the Government of Kosovo urging 
dismissal and ultimately persuaded the plaintiff to dismiss the New York 
action. 
In that action, as in other national court lawsuits, several doctrines de-
termine whether national court litigation can proceed against a political 
trustee.  First, there are a number of related immunity doctrines applicable 
to the United Nations and to “states.”  Second, there is the question of 
whether trustee decisions constitute “acts of state,” which are outside the 
competence of national courts, as a matter of comity.  Third, the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens militates in favor of dismissing cases when there is 
an available, adequate, and preferable alternative forum.  The immunity 
and act of state doctrines depend on whether the U.N. is the source of au-
thority for the political trustee, and whether the trustee is entitled to be 
treated as a “state” under public international law.  The force of the forum 
non conveniens doctrine depends entirely on the existence of a specialized 
tribunal to conduct judicial review over decisions giving rise to the na-
tional-court litigation. 
a. Immunity enjoyed by the United Nations.  Political trustees may 
be shielded from national-court judgments by immunity doctrines devel-
oped to protect the United Nations and other international organizations as 
an extension of diplomatic immunity concepts.59  The availability of such 
immunity, however, turns on the role the U.N. plays in authorizing the po-
litical trusteeship and the willingness of a national court to extend diplo-
 
 59. See Veronica L. Maginnis, Limiting Diplomatic Immunity: Lessons Learned From the 1946 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 989, 1010–12 
(2003) (explaining evolution of U.N. immunity from concept of diplomatic immunity); Valerie 
Oosterveld et. al., The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 767, 801 (2002) (describing two types of immunity: diplomatic immunity and immunity for per-
sonnel conducting affairs in the context of international conventions pursuant to international agree-
ments). 
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matic immunity concepts to institutions performing governmental func-
tions. 
The United Nations, its subordinate components, and its officers enjoy 
absolute immunity under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations.60  In the Kosovo privatization case, it was possible to 
argue that UNMIK exercises the U.N.’s authority in Kosovo, delegated to 
the SRSG in Security Council Resolution 1244 through the Secretary Gen-
eral and then through the Special Representative of the Secretary General.  
UNMIK thus stood in the shoes of the U.N. itself in terms of immunity. 
Furthermore, the KTA was a creature of UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 
and exercised only those powers delegated to it under that UNMIK Regula-
tion.  Thus, KTA could argue that it enjoyed the same immunity as the 
delegating authority.  Just as UNMIK would be immune from private suit 
in the national courts of foreign countries were it to have taken on the pri-
vatization task itself rather than delegating the function to KTA, KTA 
likewise was immune. 
That UNMIK has partially waived immunity for KTA, by subjecting it 
to suit in the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, did not al-
ter the reality that its immunity against suit in other courts remained intact.  
In this respect, its immunity was similar to that of agencies of the United 
States Government, which remain immune from breach-of-contract actions 
in the regular federal courts despite partial waiver of immunity in the 
Tucker Act for suits in the United States Claims Court.61 
The same arguments would have been available to resist national-
court litigation over the decisions of the political trustee in East Timor.62  In 
other political trusteeships, however, such an argument would be weakened 
because other sources of law, such as continued sovereignty in local institu-
tions63 or customary law of military occupation,64 rather than U.N. authori-
zation, provided the legal foundation for governmental powers exercised by 
the political trustee. 
b. Immunity under the IOIA.  It also was possible to argue that KTA 
enjoyed immunity derived from the United Nation’s immunity under § 7(b) 
 
 60. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, art. II, § 2, 
21 U.S.T. 1418, 1422 T.I.A.S. 6900 [hereinafter "Convention on the Privileges and Immunities"]. 
 61. See Ward v. Brown, 22 F.3d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1994) (Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
of breach of contract actions seeking more than $10,000 unless some statute other than Tucker Act 
waives sovereign immunity). 
 62. See infra Part II.C. 
 63. Bosnia is the strongest example. See infra Part II.A. 
 64. Afghanistan and Iraq are examples. See Parts II.D and II.E. 
PERRITT.DOC 4/26/2005  4:29 PM 
18 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 15:1 
of the International Organizations Immunity Act (“IOIA”).65  The IOIA 
confers immunity such as is enjoyed by foreign states, thus linking it to 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) immunity.66  It covers organi-
zations, such as the United Nations, in which the United States participates 
pursuant to a treaty, and which the President has designated by Executive 
order.67  The President designated the United Nations as an organization 
covered by the immunities conferred by the IOIA in Executive Order No. 
9698.68 
According to this argument, KTA, deriving its power and thus its im-
munity from the United Nations, was immune from suit in a U.S. judicial 
forum.  This would be so under the IOIA, which may confer the absolute 
immunity foreign governments enjoyed at the time of the IOIA’s passage 
instead of conferring only the restrictive immunity provided for in the later-
enacted FSIA.69  In several reported cases, federal courts have suggested 
that U.N. immunity under the treaty and/or under the IOIA is broader than 
FSIA immunity, although the facts of some cases made it unnecessary to 
reach that question.70 
Under this structure, the KTA, deriving its powers from the United 
Nations, was entitled to the same absolute immunity the U.N. enjoys under 
the IOIA. 
Both the treaty-based and the statutory immunity arguments depended 
entirely on the authority of the political trustee flowing from the United 
Nations.  In a political trusteeship organized outside the U.N. system, these 
arguments would be altogether unavailable. 
c. Immunity under the FSIA.  It can be argued that political trustees, 
such as UNMIK and their instrumentalities, such as the KTA, are immune 
 
 65. See 22 U.S.C. § 288a (2000). 
 66. See id. 
 67. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2000). 
 68. 11 C.F.R. § 1809 (1946). 
 69. Compare Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that Congress did not intend restrictive immunity doctrine of FSIA to apply to IOIA) with Boimah 
v. United Nations Gen. Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (identifying uncertainty as to 
the scope of IOIA immunity but finding it unnecessary to resolve the ambiguity because the United Na-
tions' had absolute immunity under the convention). 
 70. See Emmanuel v. United States, 253 F.3d 755, 756 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that U.S. troops 
acting under U.N. authority in Haiti enjoyed United Nation's absolute immunity under treaty; not men-
tioning IOIA); De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 F. Supp. 531, 533 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding it 
unnecessary to consider exceptions of FSIA because convention provided sufficient ground for finding 
U.N. immune); Askir v. Boutros-Ghali, 933 F. Supp. 368, 372–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suggesting that 
U.N. immunity under treaty is broader than FSIA immunity but not deciding question because chal-
lenged conduct did not fall within commercial activity exception). 
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from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),71 which 
provides, subject to certain statutory exceptions, that “a foreign state shall 
be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”72  The 
FSIA defines “foreign state” to include political subdivisions, agencies, and 
instrumentalities of foreign states.73  Such sub-state entities are defined in 
turn to include entities which are separate legal persons, corporate or oth-
erwise, which are organs of foreign states or subdivisions thereof.74 
For a political trustee to qualify for FSIA immunity, it must be entitled 
to the status of a foreign state, and its activities giving rise to the contro-
versy must not fall within one of the statutory exceptions for immunity, es-
pecially the exception for “commercial activities.”75 
 i.  Is the Political Trustee a “state?”  Persuasive arguments exist 
under U.S. law that political trustees qualify as “states” under the FSIA be-
cause they perform quintessentially governmental functions.  In Kosovo, 
this argument was supported by the terms of the Security Council resolu-
tion setting up the political trusteeship.76  In Underhill v. Hernandez,77 de-
cided before enactment of the FSIA, the Supreme Court held that what mat-
ters for treatment as a sovereign is not formal recognition of the defendant 
as a “government,” but the exercise of governmental authority.78  The KTA 
exercised governmental authority and therefore was entitled to immunity 
under the FSIA.  Moreover, privatization, the activity challenged in the 
Kosovo lawsuit, was intertwined with exercise of these functions.79 
 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et. seq. (2000). 
 72. Id. §1604 (2000). 
 73. Id. § 1603(a). 
 74. Id. § 1603(b). 
 75. Id. § 1603. 
 76. Section 11 of Security Council Resolution 1244 defines the powers of the "international civil 
presence" in Kosovo, to be established by the Secretary General, to include "performing basic civilian 
administrative functions."  S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 16, at 3.  Section 1(1) of UNMIK Regulation 
1999/1 provides that "All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the 
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General."  UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999), available at http://www.unmik 
online.org/regulations/1999/reg01-99.htm. 
 77. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
 78. Id. at 252. 
 79. In his report to the Security Council on October 30, 2003, the SRSG referred to privatization 
as "essential" and the "only hope" for reducing 57 percent unemployment and other economic chal-
lenges.  Short-Term Outlook Uncertain, but Strong Desire of Kosovo's People for Peace, Stability is 
Clear, Head of Mission Tells Security Council: Press Release, U.N. SCOR, 4853rd mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. 
SC/7909 (2003).  The mandate of Resolution 1244 could not have been achieved without governmental 
authority to alter property ownership rights. KTA is an integral part of the governmental apparatus es-
tablished in Kosovo by the SRSG.  UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 characterizes KTA as an "independent 
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Outside the political trusteeship context, the activities of privatization 
agencies in other states have been uniformly viewed as falling with the 
FSIA, although case authority is mixed on whether such activities may 
nevertheless produce liability under the commercial activities exception of 
the Act, as considered in the next section.80 
 
body" under § 11.2 of the Constitutional Framework.  See UNMIK Regulation 2002/12; UNMIK Regu-
lation 2001/9.  Section 11.1 recognizes independent governmental bodies such as the Central Election 
Commission, the Kosovo Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the Office of the Auditor-General, the 
Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo, the Independent Media Commission, the Board of the 
Public Broadcaster, and the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property Claims 
Commission.  UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 § 11.1.  Section 11.2 provides: "The bodies and offices speci-
fied [in § 11.1], and such other independent bodies and offices as may be established by law, shall have 
the powers, obligations, and composition specified in the legal instruments by which they are estab-
lished."  Chapter 11 thus contemplates the existence of agencies, plainly governmental in character, that 
operate independently of UNMIK and local governmental institutions.  Id. chap. 11.  The reference to 
chapter 11 of UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 in UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 reinforces the conclusion that 
KTA's pedigree is governmental rather than private.  See UNMIK Regulation 2002/12. 
Section 3 of UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 defines "corporation" to include "a limited liability com-
pany or a joint stock company . . . recognized as such under the Regulation on Business Organizations."  
By characterizing KTA as an "independent body" rather than as a "corporation," UNMIK manifested an 
intent to classify KTA's functions as governmental rather than commercial. 
The same conclusion flows from an examination of KTA functions, which are those of a govern-
mental agency, not those of a commercial enterprise.  The KTA, within its sphere of delegated authority 
under UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, exercises legislative and executive functions.  Unlike a commercial 
enterprise or a common-law trustee, KTA enjoys more power than simply the power to contract or to 
administer assets.  It has the power to impose legal obligations on third parties and the power to alter 
property rights−powers associated with governments.  KTA can "modify the authority" of the govern-
ance entities such as the chairman, directors, managers, and boards of enterprises under its control.  Id. 
§ 6.1(c).  It has authority to modify charters, by-laws and other relevant enterprise documents.  Id. § 
6.1(k).  It can require employees and contractors to provide information.  Id. § 6.1(g).  It can compel 
persons controlling documents regarding enterprises to produce those documents.  Id. § 6.1(h).  It can 
establish a business registry.  Id. § 8.3.  It can suspend lawsuits.  Id. § 9.3.  It is empowered to establish 
bidding processes to sell off assets of enterprises.  Id. § 10.2(b).  It can seek the assistance of the police 
and NATO military forces.  Id. § 26.  It can impose fines.  Id. § 27.  These are inherently governmental 
powers, not commercial activities.  Moreover, KTA, like governmental entities, but unlike commercial 
entities, is exempt from taxation.  Id. §§ 23.1–23.2. 
 80. In Sablic v. Croatia Line, 719 A.2d 172, 177 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), the New Jersey 
intermediate court held that the Croatian Privatization Fund was a foreign entity entitled to FSIA im-
munity.  In World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a variety of con-
tract claims asserted by an entity granted management rights over a state-owned uranium mining enter-
prise in Kazakhstan.  The court held that Kazakhstan and its instrumentalities had not waived FSIA 
immunity.  See id.  The lawsuit alleged that the contracts were not performed because of certain deci-
sions reached in the Kazakhstan privatization process.  The plaintiff did not assert the commercial ac-
tivities exception and relied instead on the waiver exception. Id. at 1161.  The court held that certain 
defendants were entitled to FSIA immunity and that immunity had been waived only for certain claims 
that fell within the act of state doctrine.  See id. at 1164–66.  As to claims against a private corporation, 
which allegedly interfered with the plaintiffs' contracts, the court remanded for determination whether 
personal jurisdiction existed based on an alleged meeting in the United States involving that private 
defendant.  See id. at 1169. 
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The availability of this source of prima facie immunity in other na-
tional courts would depend on the degree to which forum law81 applies 
sovereign immunity doctrines similar to those codified in the FSIA.  Such 
an approach is likely because the FSIA expresses customary international 
law regarding sovereign immunity.82 
 ii.  Are the political trustee’s acts within the commercial activities 
exception to immunity?  The greatest weakness of the FSIA argument is 
that many of the actions of political trustees likely to be challenged in na-
tional courts may fall within the commercial activities exception of the 
FSIA.  This exception withholds immunity from a foreign state when the 
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States 
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; 
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States83 
The purpose of the commercial activities exception is to restrict “the 
sovereign immunity of foreign states . . . to cases involving acts of a for-
eign state which are sovereign or governmental in nature, as opposed to 
acts which are either commercial in nature or those which private persons 
normally perform.”84 
Two district court cases found privatization in other countries to be 
within the commercial activities exception of the FSIA.  In WMW Machin-
ery, Inc. v. Werkzeugmaschinenhandel GMBH,85 the district court held that 
the German privatization agency (the German Treuhand) was not entitled 
to sovereign immunity because the privatization agency, though an entity 
of the state of Germany, fell within the commercial activities exception.86  
WMW Machinery satisfied the “direct effect” requirement of the commer-
 
 81. Under choice of law doctrines expressed in private international law, immunity is a question to 
be decided by the law of the forum.  See generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. 
INT'L L. J. 1, 42 (1991) (immunity is aspect of comity, which in turn is aspect of forum law). 
 82. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (explaining history of 
FSIA); Michael P. Davis, Accountability and World Leadership: Impugning Sovereign Immunity, 99 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (1999) (explaining that other states and international treaties accept restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, § 1602 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604 (the commercial 
activities exception of the FSIA expresses the so-called "restrictive" interpretation of sovereign immu-
nity); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486–87 (explaining history of FSIA and embrace of restrictive theory of 
immunity). 
 85. 960 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y 1997). 
 86. Id. at 742. 
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cial activities exception, because the contract sued on was to be performed 
in the United States.  Other cases might be distinguishable if the challenged 
actions of the political trustee were entirely extraterritorial in effect.87 
In Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras,88 the district court 
found subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activities exception 
to the FSIA, rejecting the defendants’ arguments that “privatizing a na-
tional cement industry is an action that could only be taken by a foreign 
sovereign, and . . . [was] thus not ‘commercial activity.’  [That] 
[p]rivatization . . . is merely the ‘flip side’ of nationalization, a quintessen-
tially sovereign prerogative.”89  The district court also rejected the argu-
ment that the Act of State Doctrine applied to the “unquestionably com-
mercial” privatization decisions by the government of Honduras.90  It also 
found personal jurisdiction based on meetings held by Honduran officials 
in the United States. 
Importantly, the Ampac court held that, “Engaging in a program of 
privatization does not automatically insulate Honduras from suit in the 
United States.”91  It is well accepted that the applicability of the commer-
cial activities exception is determined, not with reference to the purpose of 
the entity claiming immunity under the FSIA, but with reference to its spe-
cific activities drawn into question in the litigation.92  In Ampac, the activ-
ity in litigation was “[t]he sale of a company from its owners to the highest 
bidder . . . [in] a routine commercial transaction.”93 
Arguments to avoid the commercial activities exception would be 
stronger in a case in which, unlike WMW Machinery and Ampac, a contro-
 
 87. Compare Dar El-Bina Eng'g & Contracting Co. v. Republic of Iraq, 79 F. Supp. 2d 374, 382 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (dismissing claim for nonpayment of commercial obligation as falling outside com-
mercial activities exception of FSIA because no obligation to make payment in United States) with 
Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that payment of 
debt in the United States was sufficient to satisfy direct effect requirement of FSIA commercial activi-
ties exception), aff'd, 941 F.2d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasizing payment in New York as factual 
consideration in finding direct effect), aff'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (holding that 
impairment of New York's status as a "financial center" was insufficient, but that contract performance 
in New York was sufficient, to satisfy direct effects test). 
 88. 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 89. Id. at 976. 
 90. Id. at 978. 
 91. Id. at 976 (emphasis added). 
 92. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (issue in applying commercial activities exception is 
whether "particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the 
type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce'"); see also WMW 
Machinery, 960 F. Supp. at 739 (finding specific activities of privatization agency within commercial 
activities exception; rejecting argument that overall function of privatization was governmental, not 
commercial, in character). 
 93. Ampac, 797 F. Supp. at 976. 
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versy involves an effort to litigate policy decisions made by a political trus-
tee rather than execution of a contract to be performed partially in the 
United States, or another state adopting the commercial activities exception 
whose courts are asked to review political trustee decisions. 
d. The Act of State Doctrine.  When a U.S. court has jurisdiction 
over a claim,94 the Act of State Doctrine obliges the courts to accept the 
acts of the foreign sovereign as valid.95  The policies supporting the doc-
trine center on notions of international comity, separation of powers, and a 
desire to avoid embarrassing the Executive in its conduct of foreign rela-
tions.96  Because of these policy considerations and because ruling on the 
validity of foreign sovereign acts uncomfortably approaches the political 
question doctrine, U.S. courts routinely avoid ruling on the validity of for-
eign sovereignties’ acts.97 
The Act of State Doctrine is a widely-applied common law doctrine of 
judicial decision making rather than a statutory command.98  In W.S. 
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., the Court stated that 
“[a]ct of state issues only arise when a court must decide—that is, when the 
outcome of the case turns upon—the effect of official action by a foreign 
sovereign.”99  In World Wide Minerals, the court of appeals held that the 
Act of State Doctrine foreclosed litigation of certain claims involving pri-
vatization as to which the state of Kazakhstan and its instrumentalities had 
waived immunity. 100 
Whether the Act of State Doctrine shields political trustee decisions 
depends on whether decisions of a political trustee are those of a state for 
purposes of the doctrine.  Judicial deference for acts of state extends to 
duly authorized agents of the sovereign state acting for governmental pur-
poses.  The Court in Underhill held that the acts of a military commander 
 
 94. I.e., when the defendants do not enjoy immunity. 
 95. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (courts of one country must not sit in judgment on acts of another 
government). 
 96. See World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1165 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tec-
tonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 408 (1990)). 
 97. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727 (1976) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (ruling on foreign acts of state approaches political questions that are non-justiciable in 
federal courts); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1962) (questions involving foreign relations 
would require judiciary to exercise discretion committed to the Executive); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 reporters' note 4 (1987). 
 98. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).  See Ricaud v. Am. 
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918). 
 99. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406 (emphasis in original). 
 100. World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1164. 
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in Venezuela were subject to immunity.101  “The immunity of individuals 
from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own 
States, . . . must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by 
paramount force as matter of fact.”102  “[T]he acts of the defendant were the 
acts of the government of Venezuela, . . . [and thus] are not properly the 
subject of adjudication in the courts of another government.”103  The Court 
broadly extended the protection of the sovereign to all agents acting under 
its authority. 
Agents must have a grant of authority from the sovereign that indi-
cates the intent of the sovereign to have the agent act on its behalf.104  But 
when the facts alone are sufficient to show that the agent was acting pub-
licly and within the sovereign’s authority, then those agents are still entitled 
to the same respect in U.S. courts as the courts would accord to the sover-
eign.105 
Unless political trustees are recognized as “states” on the international 
stage, qualification for the Act of State Doctrine is problematic.  The rec-
ognition problem is mitigated when the political trustee derives authority 
entirely from the United Nations because the United States has recognized 
the sovereignty of the United Nations as an international body,106 and agen-
cies and instrumentalities of the United Nations in Kosovo enjoy the privi-
lege of comity in the U.S. courts. 
Even if the activities of a political trustee fall within the commercial 
activities exception of the FSIA, this does not foreclose judicial deference 
under the Act of State Doctrine.  A commercial activities exception is not 
part of the Act of State Doctrine.  In Dunhill, a majority of the Supreme 
Court did not accept the idea advanced by four justices that the Act of State 
Doctrine extends only to governmental acts and not to commercial ones.  
“[W]e are in no sense compelled to recognize as an act of state the purely 
commercial conduct of foreign governments . . . .”107  Four dissenting jus-
tices reasoned that even if the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
were adopted (as it subsequently was in the FSIA), “it does not follow that 
there should be a commercial act exception to the Act of State Doctrine.”108 
 
 101. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 254. 
 104. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 691–95. 
 105. See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Ri-
caud, 246 U.S. at 309. 
 106. Exec. Ord. No. 9698, 11 Fed. Reg. 1809 (Feb. 19, 1946). 
 107. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697–98.  Justice Stevens did not join in this part of the opinion. 
 108. Id. at 724 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Subsequently, in Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC),109 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit observed that “[t]he act of state doctrine is not diluted by the commer-
cial activity exception which limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
While purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an act of 
state, certain seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state consid-
erations.”110  It held that price fixing activity by OPEC fell within the Act 
of State Doctrine. 
Even when a political trustee’s decisions are “seemingly commercial,” 
a court is not foreclosed from applying the Act of State Doctrine.  When 
the ultimate goals a political trustee hopes to achieve through decisions re-
late to the private sector and the means it must use to reach those goals, a 
United States court’s second-guessing of those acts implicates the same 
policy concerns leading to the Act of State Doctrine.  Application of the 
Act of State Doctrine has always been within the court’s discretion.  When 
the activities that a court must judge possess certain commercial character-
istics, courts must recognize that applying the Act of State Doctrine is not 
only permitted, but also necessary. 
Inserting U.S. courts into difficult, interrelated, and ultimately politi-
cal controversies over the scope of political trusteeship and development of 
the private sector in the trust territory, would cripple the political trustee’s 
ability to build an efficient market economy in post-conflict situations.  
Applying the Act of State Doctrine would avoid that result. 
In Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,111 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that the “function of the court in applying the act of 
state doctrine is to weigh in balance the foreign policy interests that favor 
or disfavor its application . . . .  The doctrine demands a case-by-case 
analysis of the extent to which in the context of a particular dispute separa-
tion of powers concerns are implicated.”112  When the United States Gov-
ernment supports a political trusteeship, the Act of State Doctrine militates 
against litigation in U.S. courts over the conduct of the political trustee.  In 
such a case, the foreign policy concerns are paramount, unlike Bigio, where 
the only identifiable act of state was decades old and had apparently been 
repudiated by the current foreign government, WMW Machinery, where the 
court found governmental policy decisions irrelevant to the issue in suit,113 
 
 109. 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 110. Id. at 1360. 
 111. 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 112. Id. at 452 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 113. WMW Machinery, 960 F. Supp. at 745. 
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or Ampac Group, where the court without much analysis, found the trans-
actions in dispute to be unquestionably commercial in nature and not linked 
to any Executive Branch objective.114 
Availability of Act of State arguments in national courts other than 
those of the United States depends on the acceptance and interpretation of 
the Doctrine by those courts, which in turn is difficult to predict because 
the doctrine is discretionary and derived from national law of comity and 
customary international law rather than treaty.115 
3. Suits against a state sponsoring or participating in political trus-
teeship.  In cases in which the United Nations is not the sponsor of the po-
litical trusteeship, or in which litigants are pessimistic about their ability to 
overcome the immunity and act of state doctrines, they may seek to litigate 
against states participating in or sponsoring a political trusteeship.  In such 
cases, immunity barriers could be overcome by waiver of immunity for 
administrative or constitutional review in domestic courts of the defendant 
state. 
a. Suits against the United States Government.  The clearest exam-
ple to date of a political trusteeship established by a single state is Iraq.  
The U.S. Government’s establishment of the political trusteeship in Iraq 
presents the possibility for review of trustee decisions under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act or under various other constitutional and statutory 
theories limiting U.S. governmental action that infringes private rights.116  
 
 114. Ampac, 797 F. Supp. at 978. 
 115. See Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 384 
n.351 (1986) (describing debate over degree to which other legal systems apply act of state doctrine). 
 116. Decisions involving CPA contracts could be characterized as administration of U.S. govern-
ment contracts under the Tucker Act.  The Tucker Act explicitly empowers the United States Court of 
Federal Claims to consider breach of contract arguments.  See Christopher Village, L.P. v. United 
States, 360 F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Tucker Act 
to hear breach of contract claims against governmental entities).  Actions under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act also are possible. See generally Couzado v. United States, 105 F.3d 1389, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the foreign country exception to FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000), did not apply in case 
where negligent interagency coordination and training occurred in U.S., resulting in mistreatment of 
plaintiffs in Honduras).  Intentional torts, such as the tort of intentional interference with contractual 
relations arising from interfering with pre-invasion or post-invasion contract rights, are unlikely to suc-
ceed because the FTCA explicitly excludes claims for intentional interference with contract and other 
specified intentional torts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000); Pauly v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 348 F.3d 
1143, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of misrepresentation claims against federal agency). 
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Analogous possibilities exist for national court litigation in other countries 
exercising direct authority in conjunction with a political trusteeship.117 
The availability of these sources of judicial review in national courts 
would depend, first, on the degree to which trustee decisions are reasonably 
characterized as decisions by states (or their governmental officials) mak-
ing up or authorizing the political trusteeship and, second, on the degree to 
which the national law of national courts in those states excludes from re-
view decisions by colonial or military occupation authorities of those gov-
ernments. 
The following concrete hypothetical examples illustrate the possibili-
ties: 
A U.S. citizen sues Iraqi police to compel release of detained Iraqi, 
challenging the decision of a lower level CPA security official that the Iraqi 
should be detained for investigation of past Baathist Party ties.118 
The Turkish owner of oil production equipment sues the Iraqi govern-
ing authority under the alien tort claims act for conversion, based on the 
decision by the new oil ministry to use the equipment without satisfying 
rent and debt service obligations incurred by the former Ministry.119 
An Austrian claimant against an Iraqi company attaches assets of that 
company in Austria, drawing into question a determination by the CPA that 
the assets should be frozen pending comprehensive resolution for Iraq 
claims.120 
A British cellphone operator sues the CPA for awarding a major cell-
phone contract to another. 
A Saudi subject sues the CPA for denying rights to start air service be-
tween Baghdad and Riyadh. 
 
 117. See infra Parts VI.B (discussing administrative review in France), VI.C (discussing adminis-
trative review in Germany), VI.A (discussing judicial review of decisions by institutions of European 
Union). 
 118. Compare Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1289–90 (9th Cir. 2003) (habeas corpus review 
available to alien detained by U.S. military forces on U.S. controlled territory in Cuba) with Al Odah v. 
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding access to U.S. courts is unavailable to 
aliens to challenge detention by U.S. military authorities outside of U.S. territory), cert. granted, 72 
U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-343). 
 119. See generally Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 705 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal 
of suit for conversion, among other things, under Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350); but cf. 
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 97 Civ. 2858, 1998 WL 293990, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1998) (claim for 
conversion not cognizable under Alien Tort Act because not part of "law of nations"), rev'd on other 
grounds by, 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 120. Cf. Jugobanka A.D. Belgrade v. U.C.F. Int'l Trading, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (denying motion to dismiss counterclaim by bank for seizure of assets by former Yugoslavia state 
bank). 
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The broadest basis for review, sufficient to encompass the cellphone 
and air-service examples, would exist under the U.S. Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.  The Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immu-
nity, presumes reviewability, and provides a form of action.121  The APA 
also could provide, in Section 706, bases for judicial invalidation of CPA 
and GCI decisions on substantive-irrationality,122 procedural-irregularity,123 
ultra vires,124 and constitutional grounds.125 
In Iraq, unlike the other political trusteeships, the United States Gov-
ernment exercises ultimate authority through the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority.  This may open the door to judicial review in U.S. courts.  The 
Governing Council of Iraq (“GCI”), despite its Iraqi membership, arguably 
is an instrumentality of the United States Government because the United 
States selected its membership and defined the scope of its power.126  Con-
troversies over CPA and GCI decisions involve, not some independent for-
eign government seeking to exercise authority; it involves persons exercis-
ing U.S. governmental authority. 
Because the CPA and the GCI exist only by virtue of appointment by 
an American cabinet officer transferring authority to them, a strong argu-
ment exists that the CPA and GCI are “authorities of the United States” and 
therefore agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act.  Even if the 
CPA and GCI are not agencies, the Secretary of Defense manifestly is an 
agency. 
Fairly strong arguments against APA review exist, in particular that 
the CPA and GCI are explicitly outside the definition of agency either be-
cause they constitute the government of a U.S. territory (§ 551 (1)(C)), or 
because they represent the exercise of military authority in occupied terri-
tory (§ 551 (1)(G)).127  Moreover, matters “committed to agency discretion 
by law” are unreviewable under the APA.128  This category, pursuant to 
 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (waiving sovereign immunity); id. § 704 (authorizing judicial review); 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (judicial review not foreclosed without persuasive 
evidence that was Congressional purpose); 5 U.S.C. § 703 (form and venue for judicial review proceed-
ing). 
 122. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 123. Id. § 706(2)(D). 
 124. Id. § 706(2)(C). 
 125. Id. § 706(2)(B). 
 126. See CPA Reg. No. 6 (July 13, 2003), available at http://www.cpairaq.org/regulations/ 
20030713_CPAREG_6_Governing_Council_of_Iraq_.pdf. 
 127. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1149 (stating that the APA did not waive sovereign immunity for 
alien detainees in Guantanamo Bay because of military function exception to definition of agency; em-
phasizing capture on military field of battle and military nature of confinement). 
 128. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Webster v. Doe,129 surely extends to the foreign 
affairs category of decisions.130 
But these impediments to review under the APA are not assured of ac-
ceptance.  What is involved in Iraq is not the exercise of military authority, 
but civil, executive, legislative and judicial authority, in the express words 
of the Administrator of the CPA.131  The decisions likely to be objected to 
in U.S. litigation are civilian matters and not something within the tradi-
tional inherent martial law power of the President and the military forces. 
If APA coverage and reviewability could be established, many of the 
political-trustee decisions would be vulnerable to attack.  Any of the CPA 
or GCI legislative acts are invalid under Section 706(2)(D) because they 
were not developed under any of the procedures required by Section 553.  
Many of the legislative acts also are invalid under Section 706(2)(A) be-
cause they are wholly unexplained and thus arbitrary and capricious under 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers132 and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park  v. 
Volpe.133 
Even if APA review is unavailable, plaintiffs also might assert a 
Bivens action against the Secretary of Defense or against CPA civilian per-
sonnel or U.S. Army personnel on the grounds that they are acting to de-
prive the plaintiffs of constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment 
without valid authority of law.134  Any political trustee decisions with fi-
nancial impact are likely to result in deprivations of property interests of 
U.S. persons.  Such persons cannot be deprived of property without due 
process of law.  Substantive due process requires decisional rationality, and 
the CPA and GCI frequently offer no rationale for their rules and orders, 
 
 129. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606, 608–09 (1988) ("committed to agency discretion by 
law" within language of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) and encompasses political question doctrine) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 130. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1150 (decisions by military custodian of alien detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay were not judicially reviewable under APA because they were committed to agency discre-
tion by law; emphasizing capture on military field of battle and military nature of confinement). 
 131. CPA Reg. No. 1 § 1(2). 
 132. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983) (finding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in rescinding the passive restraint requirement). 
 133. See generally Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that 
reviewing court must decide if agency action was arbitrary and capricious after it concludes that action 
was authorized by statute). 
 134. Cf. Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1382–83 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
Bivens action against state officers for procuring arrest in Mexico, hinting that Bivens claim might be 
available against federal officials for same sort of claim; also suggesting that alien might be able to 
maintain claim against U.S. officials if detention in foreign country were arbitrary under Alien Tort Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)). 
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thus violating substantive due process.  While Londoner v. City and County 
of Denver135 and Bi-Metallic Investment Corp. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion136 define a fairly relaxed procedural due process standard for quasi leg-
islative decision making, procedural due process still has meaning in the 
rulemaking context.  At least, the CPA and GCI should afford some kind of 
notice of their intent to promulgate legislation and provide some opportu-
nity for affected parties to offer their views before the CPA or GCI make a 
final decision—something in the nature of a legislative hearing.  When they 
do not do so, they cannot enforce their rules consistent with procedural due 
process. 
A Bivens action does not lie when there are other remedial channels, 
and the government would argue that the tribunals in Iraq or the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act represent such alternative channels.  This argument 
would have greater force if the political trustee set up specialized tribunals 
for judicial review, as in the case of the Special Chamber to review privati-
zation actions in Kosovo. 
Persons suffering legal wrong or adversely effected are likely to in-
clude American citizens, some of whom may not—in the relevant time pe-
riod—ever have left the United States.  By analogy, a plaintiff could claim 
that revoking a contract right of an American citizen because of something 
someone did in another country, is like the welfare benefit in Goldberg v. 
Kelly137 or the employment tenure expectancies in Perry v. Sindermann138 
and Board of Regents v. Roth.139  A U.S. court may not be able to apply 
U.S. law to the conduct occurring in Iraq, but it surely can apply U.S. law 
to decisions made in the United States with effects felt primarily in the 
United States. 
These legal pathways for review of Iraqi political trustee decisions in 
U.S. courts are speculative at best, but they illustrate the possibility of na-
tional court review—a possibility that would be diminished if specialized 
channels for review were established as a part of the political trusteeship 
framework. 
b. Suits against European governments.  European states are spon-
sors of political trusteeships in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, ei-
 
 135. 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
 136. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 137. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 138. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 139. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
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ther through their membership in the U.N. Security Council, or more di-
rectly as in the case of EU administration of “Pillar IV” in Kosovo.140 
The charter of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) permits 
any person to commence an action in the Court against any member of the 
Council of Europe alleging a violation of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.141  Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the Convention guarantees “peaceful enjoyment of . . . 
possessions,”142 and this provision has been interpreted to cover cases of 
privatization and nationalization.  States have wide latitude to determine 
state interests that justify alteration of property relationships, but the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights has held that states must provide access to fair 
judicial procedures to determine the compensation due for interference with 
property rights.  And, of course, the Convention protects a wide range of 
liberty interests, circumscribing detention and criminal prosecution.  In ad-
dition, the Convention protects individual access to judicial mechanisms to 
protect private rights of all kinds. 
The principal obstacle to bringing a case seeking ECHR review of a 
political trustee decision would be attributing responsibility for trustee ac-
tion to a signatory of the Convention.  In no case of political trusteeship so 
far has any European state taken on primary responsibility, unlike the 
United States in Iraq.  Rather, European states have participated only col-
lectively in political trusteeships.  The fact that the European Union has as-
sumed responsibility does not facilitate access to the ECHR because the 
European Union is not a signatory to the European Convention and thus is 
not a permissible party defendant before the ECHR. 
It is difficult to find precedent for a single person—natural or juridi-
cal—being held liable for collective decisions, as of decisions by the U.N. 
Security Council or by a corporate board of directors.143 
 
 140. Pillar IV is the Economic Reconstruction branch of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo. (UNMIK). 
 141. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1998), art. 34. 
 142. Id. protocol 1, art. 1. 
 143. See Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 525–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (implying that corporate direc-
tors may be held jointly liable for inattention to fiduciary duties).  Joint liability in tort exists when per-
sons tortiously act in concert., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979), or when they are sub-
ject to a common duty to the victim. Id. § 878.  Tort liability seems impermissible, however, when the 
alleged tortfeasors act through an enterprise that has independent legal personality and limited liability. 
See Pereira, 294 B.R. at 526–27 (considering whether appropriate to "pierce the corporate veil"). 
Yugoslavia has, so far unsuccessfully, sought to hold individual members of NATO liable for al-
leged violations of international law committed by NATO in the 1999 intervention in Kosovo.  See 
Banković & Others v. Belgium & 16 Other Contracting States, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2001) (finding claim by Serb citizens against NATO members for damages suffered during bombing 
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4. Doctrine of forum non conveniens.  When a political trustee pro-
vides for judicial review in specialized tribunals, avoidance of national 
court litigation is possible under the doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in 
U.S. courts and in the courts of other common-law countries144 such as 
England,145 Scotland,146 Canada,147 and Australia.148  The doctrine is un-
available in civil-law countries because it violates strict jurisdictional rules 
under procedure codes.149  Even in those countries, however, a related doc-
trine, lis pendens, allows staying an action in favor of a similar action al-
ready pending in the court of another state,150 presumably including courts 
established by a political trustee.  The forum non conveniens and related lis 
pendens doctrines provide the strongest linkage between specialized review 
mechanisms for political trustee decisions and the availability of national-
court review. 
The United States Supreme Court applies a two-prong test to deter-
mine whether a court should dismiss a case on forum non conveniens 
 
campaign to be "inadmissible" before European Court of Human Rights), available at 
http://www.ehcr.coe.int/eng; id. at para. 32 (summarizing French argument that bombardment not im-
putable to respondent States but to NATO, which had separate international legal personality); id. at 
para. 66 (ECHR applies only to signatory action taken within its own territory).  In a series of cases 
filed in 1999 in the International Court of Justice, Serbia and Montenegro claimed that NATO members 
violated international law by their bombing campaign and their support of the Kosovo Liberation Army.  
See, e.g., Press Release, International Court of Justice, Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. 
Belg.) (Apr. 29, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm.  The 
cases are still pending. 
 144. The doctrine permits discretionary refusal of jurisdiction in all common-law countries, but the 
standards for its application differ from country to country. See infra text accompanying notes 146–148. 
 145. Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 
455, 481–82 (1994) (characterizing English version of doctrine as more focused on identifying the 
"best" forum). 
 146. Peter J. Carney, International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5"—A Proposal in the 
Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 415, 424–25 (1995) (doctrine 
originated in Scotland). 
 147. See Donald J. Carney, Forum Non Conveniens in the United States and Canada, 3 BUFF. J. 
INT'L L. 117, 126 (1996) (describing Canadian doctrine as: first, determining whether better forum ex-
ists for trying case, and second, determining whether plaintiff would be disadvantaged by dismissal); id. 
at 133 (procedural or substantive law disadvantages for plaintiff in alternative bars dismissal on forum 
non conveniens grounds in Canada). 
 148. Id. at 118 (forum non conveniens doctrine routinely applied to inter-provincial litigation in 
Canada); Bryan P. Werley, Aussie Rules: Universal Jurisdiction Over Internet Defamation, 18 TEMP. 
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199, 218 (2004) (offering example of application of forum non conveniens by Aus-
trialian court). 
 149. Reus, supra note 145, at 489 (giving reasons for hostility to doctrine by civil law jurists); id. at 
495–502 (discussing controversy over doctrine in Germany and other civil-law systems). 
 150. See Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 
26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949 (2001) (suggesting that eventual Hague convention on international jurisdic-
tion and judgment enforcement will contain some type of forum non conveniens provision). 
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grounds.  Under this test, the defendant moving for dismissal must show 
(1) that an alternative forum exists, and (2) that private and public interest 
factors weigh in favor of dismissal.151  The district court must give defer-
ence to the plaintiff’s choice of forum according to a sliding scale.152  Un-
der the sliding scale, less connection to the forum results in less deference 
to the plaintiff’s choice of that forum.153 
A forum is “available” when the defendant is amenable to service of 
process in the alternative jurisdiction, except in “rare circumstances . . . 
where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.”154  
In other words, the forum must be both available and adequate.  A special-
ized judicial review mechanism established by a political trustee would be 
“available” if it had jurisdiction over the political trustee.155 
An alternative forum also must be “adequate.”  The procedural law 
basis for inadequacy refers to whether there are excessive procedural limi-
tations imposed by the alternative forum.  To be an adequate alternative, a 
forum need not follow the same procedures as a U.S. court.156  In the Kos-
ovo case, the specialized judicial review forum had afforded adequate pro-
cedures.157 
 
 151. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Aus-
tria on Nov. 11, 2000, 230 F. Supp. 2d 376, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. 
Holocaust Ins. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348, 350–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing structure of forum non 
conveniens analysis). 
 152. DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 28–31 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing forum non con-
veniens dismissal because of undervaluing public interest in U.S. forum given extensive connections 
between dispute and United States and failure to give appropriate deference to representative plaintiff's 
choice of forum). 
 153. Assicurazioni Generali , 228 F. Supp. 2d  at 351 (discussing and applying a "sliding scale" 
approach to determine deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum). 
 154. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981). 
 155. See UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 § 30.1 (granting Special Chamber "exclusive jurisdiction for 
all suits against the [KTA]"). 
 156. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1987) (lack of 
jury trial does not make forum inadequate); Pavlov v. Bank of New York Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426, 
434–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (narrower scope of discovery than in U.S. courts does not make forum inade-
quate); Bell v. British Telecom, No. 95 Civ. 1972, 1995 WL 476684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1995) 
(granting dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds; unavailability of certain legal theories or proce-
dural devices in alternative forum do not make it an inadequate forum). 
 157. UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/13 § 22.7, UNMIK/DIR/2003/13 (June 11, 2003), 
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/admdirect/2003/ade2003_13.pdf (all documents 
must be in English and can also be in Serbian or Albanian); id. § 43.4 (discovery process is enforceable 
through monetary sanctions); id. § 35 (oral as well as written argument can be made before the court); 
id. §§ 55–57 (the parties have the option of invoking the appeals process of the Special Chamber); id. § 
9.3 (decisions of the Special Chamber must be in writing, specifying reasons for the decision.); id. § 21 
(parties may be represented by counsel, including foreign counsel.); id. §§ 19–36 (the Special Chamber 
allows submissions in writing and orally); id. § 18 (Special Chamber provides for compulsory process 
for obtaining testimony); id. § 9 (procedures for obtaining evidence located outside of Kosovo); id. § 43 
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A forum can be adequate without offering the same cause of action as 
a U.S. court.158  Courts have dismissed cases on forum non conveniens 
grounds when the substantive law of the alternative forum does not provide 
the same remedy as U.S. law does.  For example, RICO suits have been 
dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens because, even though a 
RICO cause of action in unavailable in alternative forums, plaintiffs can 
gain relief on other grounds.159  All that is required is for the alternative fo-
rum to provide some remedy for the underlying acts.160 
Finally, because U.S. courts avoid passing judgment on the worthiness 
of a foreign judicial system, political and social circumstances justify a 
finding that an alternative forum is inadequate only when the circumstances 
are extreme.161  For example, allegations that the Turkish court system is 
biased against U.S. parties and foreign women were insufficient to show 
forum inadequacy.162  In the Kosovo litigation a majority of the judges on 
the Special Chamber were international judges,163 and an international 
judge was the presiding judge.164  The Special Chamber had rules ensuring 
the impartiality of its judges,165 which minimized any concern of local par-
tiality.  In contrast, in In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Insur-
ance Litigation, a district court denied a motion to dismiss under forum non 
conveniens doctrine.  It found a private insurance industry forum to be an 
inadequate alternative forum because it was a private dispute resolution—a 
“company store,” dependent on interested parties.166 
Forum non conveniens also requires assessment of private and public 
interest factors.  Private interest factors include relative ease of access to 
evidence,167 availability of compulsory process for the attendance of un-
 
(Special Chamber allows for compulsory production of documents); id. § 44 (Special Chamber allows 
for production of physical items and site visits). 
 158. PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir 1998). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Bell, 1995 WL 476684, at *2.  Litigation Chamber of the Kosovo Supreme Court provides for 
a number of desirable remedies including: injunctions, UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/13 § 52, 
costs, id. at § 53, and monetary compensation equivalent to the lost assets, UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 
§ 10.3. 
 161. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1084–85 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (generalized 
allegations of partiality insufficient to show forum inadequacy, especially where party has chosen to 
transact business in the forum). 
 162. Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l., Inc., 981 F.2d 1345, 1351 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 163. UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 § 3.1 (requiring three international judges and two local judges). 
 164. See id. § 3.2 (one of the international judges much be the presiding judge). 
 165. UNMIK Administrative Direction 2003/13 § 4 (stating that, among others, a judge may not 
hold any other office or have an interest in the outcome of litigation). 
 166. Assicurazioni Generali, 228 F. Supp. 2d  at 353–58. 
 167. Id. at 359. 
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willing witnesses,168 cost of willing witness attendance,169 possibility of a 
view of premises,170 enforceability of any judgment,171 and other factors in-
fluencing the parties’ convenience.172  In Hasakis v. Trade Bulkers, Inc.,173 
a district court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that 
the witnesses were mostly outside the local forum and that the local com-
munity had no connection with litigation.174  On the other hand, the same 
court denied dismissal in In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust In-
surance Litigation, where many witnesses were in the United States and 
documentary evidence was scattered all over Europe and the burden of 
transporting it to New York was no greater than the burden of transporting 
it to one of many alternative forums.175 
Public interest factors include: local interest in having local controver-
sies decided at home, the interest of foreign forums, administrative difficul-
ties arising from court congestion, the avoidance of unnecessary conflict-
of-laws problems, and “the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated 
forum with jury duty.”176  United States courts regularly dismiss cases on 
forum non conveniens grounds when the center of gravity of a lawsuit is 
located in another country.177 
Another factor that can tip the scales in favor of a forum non conven-
iens dismissal is the avoidance of duplicative litigation, but only if the po-
litical trustee provides a forum with exclusive jurisdiction.  The Southern 
District of New York recently explained that the public and private interest 
 
 168. DiRienzo, 294 F.3d at 29–30. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Assicurazioni Generali, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
 172. DiRienzo, 294 F.3d at 30; Assicurazioni Generali 228 F. Supp. 2d at 365. 
 173. 690 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 174. Id. at 262. 
 175. Assicurazioni Generali, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 359–66. 
 176. Gilbert, 331 U.S. at 508–09; DiRienzo, 294 F.3d at 31; Assicurazioni Generali 228 F. Supp. 
2d at 367 n.15. 
 177. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235; compare Calgarth Invs., Ltd. v. Bank Saderat Iran, 
No. 95 Civ. 5332, 1996 WL 204470, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1996) (granting dismissal on forum non 
conveniens grounds because dispute has "only a minimal link to this country") and Bell, 1995 WL 
476684, at *1 (granting dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds; citizens of place of alternative fo-
rum have great interest in litigation; New York community has no interest) and DeYoung v. Beddome, 
707 F. Supp. 132, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing action on comity grounds; forum non conveniens 
analysis reinforces the comity conclusion due to strong foreign interest in dispute) with CL-Alexanders 
Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 709 F. Supp. 472, 480–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying dismissal on 
forum non conveniens grounds; securities fraud occurred in New York, most witnesses in New York) 
and Assicurazioni Generali, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 348, 367 (concluding that public interest factors weigh 
slightly in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum, given strong localized interest, based—among other 
things—on New York statute). 
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factors weighed in one direction primarily because of “the inconvenience 
and cost associated with potential duplicative litigation in the alternative 
fora of Ecuador and Italy.”178  The court went on to explain that an agree-
ment to take the dispute to only one of the two countries called for re-
examination of the balance.179  If a political trustee provides a specialized 
forum and gives it exclusive jurisdiction, respect for that exclusive jurisdic-
tion by national courts would avoid the potential for duplicative litigation. 
Though there is a presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of fo-
rum, this presumption is diminished when the lawsuit is based on activity 
that occurs abroad.  The sliding scale used to determine the deference to the 
plaintiff’s choice overlaps analysis of private and public interest factors.180  
When a political trustee’s decision has only a weak connection to the 
United States and considerations of convenience favor litigation in a spe-
cialized judicial review forum, U.S. courts should afford little weight to the 
presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum. 
If a political trustee establishes a specialized judicial tribunal to re-
view decisions by the trustee, and the characteristics of the tribunal meet 
basic due process requirements, there is a strong likelihood that courts in 
the U.S., Britain, Canada and Australia will decline to hear cases within the 
jurisdiction of the specialized tribunal.  Such an outcome is far less certain 
in civil law countries, unless a case has already been filed in the specialized 
tribunal. 
B. Failure to Provide for Judicial Review Violates Core Principles of the 
Rule of Law 
Political trusteeships extol rule of law but almost always lack one of 
the hallmarks of a rule of law in conventional democratic political sys-
tems—judicial review.  Constitutionalism envisions written constitutions 
with judicial review of legislative acts in constitutional courts to ensure that 
legislatures stay within constitutional limits.181  By extrapolation, courts or 
 
 178. F.D. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. M/V Reefer Sun, No. 02 Civ. 2936, 2003 WL 21512065, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2003). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Assicuraziona Generali, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 351 ("[T]he greater the . . . lawsuit's bona fide 
connection to the United States and to the forum of choice and the more it appears that consideration of 
convenience favor the conduct of the lawsuit in the United States, the more deference will be accorded 
plaintiff's choice of a U.S. forum . . . .") (internal quotations omitted). 
 181. See Gráinne de Búrca & Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, The Development of European Constitu-
tionalism and the Role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 355, 355 (2003); 
Christoph Henkel, Constitutionalism of the European Union: Judicial Legislation and Political Deci-
sion-Making by the European Court of Justice, 19 WIS. INT'L L. J. 153, 154 (2001); Ran Hirschl, The 
Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL. STUD. 71, 71 (2004) (criti-
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other judicial bodies must be available to protect against lawless action by 
officers assigned to execute the law.  For example, the European Court of 
Justice has held that national courts within the European Union must be 
available to review administrative decision making.182 
When conventional legislatures establish administrative agencies and 
delegate powers to them, conventional courts in the United States and spe-
cialized courts in France and Germany exist to review the exercise of the 
delegated authority—to check up on allegations of ultra vires activity when 
agency officials exceed their legislative mandate, to ensure that the agency 
acts through appropriate procedures satisfying general concepts of proce-
dural due process, and to ensure that it acts rationally, with a linkage to le-
gitimate purposes under the legislatively delegated statutory framework.183 
There is no judicial branch of the United Nations to exercise the same 
review functions over UNMIK, or other political trustees, which function 
as quasi administrative agencies.  All of the concerns exist with unaccount-
able political trustees that would exist if an administrative agency were cre-
ated by a state and entirely insulated from the capacity of the judiciary or 
any other body to review its actions. 
Indeed, the Kosovo Ombudsperson184 has determined that it is a viola-
tion of international human rights law for certain decisions by a political 
trustee not to be reviewed by an independent judicial body.185 
 
cally reviewing literature on constitutionalism); Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Per-
spective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001). 
 182. Paul R. Dubinsky, The Essential Function of Federal Courts: The European Union and the 
United States Compared, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 334 (1994) (characterizing case 222/84, Johnston v. 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] ECR 1651 and Case 222/86 Union nationale 
des entranieurs et Cadres techniques professionnels du football v. Heylens, [1987] ECR 4097). 
 183. See infra Part VII.D.1 (discussing delegation doctrine). 
 184. The Kosovo Ombudsperson, has asserted competency to consider complaints against UNMIK. 
See UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 § 10.1 (giving the Ombudsperson competence to hear complaints of 
"abuse of authority by any public authority in Kosovo.").  This is the constitutional framework docu-
ment.  It does not define "public authority."  See id.  The earlier regulation establishing the Ombuds-
peron institution, UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, gave the Ombersperson over "actions constituting an 
abuse of authority by the interim civil administration or any emerging central or local institution," a 
narrower mandate.  UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 § 3.1.  As of January 26, 2003, 9 of the 19 reports 
posted on the Ombsperson's website, www.ombudspersonkosovo.org, involved complaints against 
UNMIK. 
 185. Special Report No. 1, supra note 27, at § 7.  The Report observes that 
this grant of immunity creates an insurmountable procedural bar to any legal process in any 
territory at any time to KFOR and UNMIK as institutions, as well as to their property, funds 
and assets (Sections 2.1 and 3.1 of the Regulation, respectively) to locally recruited KFOR 
personnel in respect of words spoken and acts performed by them in carrying out tasks exclu-
sively related to their services to KFOR (Section 2.3 of the Regulation) and to international 
and locally recruited UNMIK personnel in respect of all acts performed by them in their offi-
cial capacity (Section 3.3 of the Regulation). 
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Establishing mechanisms for reviewing political trustee decisions 
would enhance legitimacy because it would cause the political trusteeship 
to conform more closely with widely accepted norms for a rule of law. 
IV.  INADEQUACY OF MILITARY  
OCCUPATION AND MARTIAL LAW MODELS 
Military occupation and martial law concepts are incomplete because 
they make certain assumptions about the relationship between civil and 
military authority that are not satisfied in modern political trusteeships.  
The limitations on exercise of governmental authority by belligerent occu-
pants are too narrow, and the law of military occupation fails to provide for 
adequate mechanism for adjudication of claims of improper decision mak-
ing by military authorities. 
A. Overly Restrictive Norms 
The law of belligerent occupation is reasonably well developed and 
emphasizes limits on the power of a belligerent occupant to change law and 
institutional arrangements, pending resumption of the government dis-
placed by the occupation. 
This is an unsatisfactory model for many political trusteeships that 
have as a core aim fundamental reform of political and economic institu-
tions.  The insufficiency of the belligerent-occupation model was one of the 
prime motivations for developing the concept of “political trusteeship.”186  
But neither belligerent occupation nor political trusteeships, in and of 
themselves, addresses the availability of administrative law review. 
B. Inadequate Mechanisms for Judicial Review 
The law of military occupation provides an incomplete model for ju-
dicial review of political trustee decisions.  While the “law of war” includes 
norms that limit the conduct of occupying forces, it does not address the 
availability of tribunals within which violations of those norms can be rec-
tified.  Moreover, the norms focus on human rights violations and not the 
 
Id. at para. 21.  It found however that "[t]he rationale for classical grants of immunity, however, does 
not apply to the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo, where the interim civilian administration (United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK) in fact acts as a surrogate state."  Id. at para. 23.  It further found 
that executive and legislative branches of government must be subject to oversight by an independent 
judiciary.  Id. at para. 24.  It also found that the yet-to-be-established Claims Commissions envisioned 
under § 7 of the UNMIK immunity regulation did not comply with the European Convention on Human 
Rights requirements for independent and impartial tribunals. Id.at para. 78. 
 186. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 412. 
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many different kinds of controversies that can arise from civilian govern-
ment. 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice primarily focuses on enforce-
ment of rules for military matters, concentrating on intra-service rela-
tions.187  Although it provides a limited mechanism for those outside the 
military service to file complaints about misconduct by service person-
nel,188 this mechanism falls short of being an adequate mechanism to re-
view official decision in the civilian sphere. 
Much of the law about the relationship between civil courts and mili-
tary occupation was developed in the context of writs of habeas corpus.189  
This body of law makes it clear that military power cannot supplant access 
to civilian courts “where the courts are open and their process unob-
structed.”190  One must be careful, however, about extrapolating this body 
of law to the political trustee context because the writ of habeas corpus is 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
Whatever duties these bodies of doctrine may impose on belligerent 
occupants or political trustees, the law is unsettled at best as to where viola-
tions of those duties impairing the legal interests of civilians in the trustee 
 
 187. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2000) states: 
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, 
and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain 
to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercis-
ing general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made.  The officer 
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper 
measures for redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to 
the Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint, with the proceedings thereon. 
 188. 10 U.S.C. § 939 (2000) states: 
(a) Whenever complaint is made to any commanding officer that willful damage has been 
done to the property of any person or that his property has been wrongfully taken by members 
of the armed forces, he may, under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may pre-
scribe, convene a board to investigate the complaint.  The board shall consist of from one to 
three commissioned officers and, for the purpose of investigation, it has power to summon 
witnesses and examine them upon oath, to receive depositions or other documentary evi-
dence, and to assess the damages sustained against the responsible parties.  The assessment of 
damages made by the board is subject to the approval of the commanding officer, and in the 
amount approved by him shall be charged against the pay of the offenders.  The order of the 
commanding officer directing charges herein authorized is conclusive on any disbursing offi-
cer for the payment by him to the injured parties of the damages as assessed and approved. 
 
(b) If the offenders cannot be ascertained, but the organization or detachment to which they 
belong is known, charges totaling the amount of damages assessed and approved may be 
made in such proportion as may be considered just upon the individual members thereof who 
are shown to have been present at the scene at the time the damages complained of were in-
flicted, as determined by the approved findings of the board. 
 189. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE (1998) (history of major 
controversies involving military occupation in the U.S. and the writ of habeas corpus). 
 190. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866). 
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territory may be redressed.191  Even if access to national courts for relief in 
the nature of habeas corpus is available, habeas is an avenue for judicial re-
view only of confinement of natural persons, not an avenue to review the 
vast range of other kinds of deprivations that may be occasioned by gov-
ernmental decisions. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL, COMPARED  
WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, REVIEW 
The concept of judicial review encompasses two subordinate con-
cepts: review of legislation to determine whether it comports with a supe-
rior constitutional document, and review of the decisions of subordinate 
governmental bodies to see if they comport with legislation.  The first can 
be labeled “constitutional review,” and the second “administrative law re-
view.”  Both levels of judicial review can exist in a political trusteeship, as 
they do in states such as Germany and France, where they are separated in-
stitutionally, and in the United States, where they occur in a unified judici-
ary.192 
Administrative law review presents many fewer difficulties for politi-
cal trusteeships than constitutional review, but both are feasible. Constitu-
tional review is easier to institutionalize if there is a written constitutional 
document establishing the political trusteeship, for example, Security 
Council Resolution 1244 for Kosovo.193  Only if the constitutional docu-
ment is reasonably specific as to the institutions and powers of the political 
trustee can an entity performing the functions of a constitutional court pro-
vide limited review of the legitimacy of trustee action without substituting 
its own political judgments for those of the trustee.  As with a common-law 
 
 191. Compare Gherebi, 352 F.3d at 1289 (finding jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions on 
behalf of Guantanamo Bay detainees).  Judge Reinhardt states: 
[W]e simply cannot accept the government's position that the Executive Branch possesses the 
unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any persons, foreign citizens included, on terri-
tory under the sole jurisdiction and control of the United States, without permitting such pris-
oners recourse of any kind to any judicial forum, or even access to counsel, regardless of the 
length or manner of their confinement. 
Id. at 1283.  But cf. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140, 1144 (aliens outside U.S. territory do not enjoy protec-
tions of Fifth Amendment, and do not enjoy privilege of litigating in U.S. courts, distinguishing resi-
dents of Micronesia, while under U.N.-authorized U.S. trusteeship). 
 192. Pennsylvania is an exception, where a separate "Commonwealth Court" has jurisdiction over 
actions to review, or appeals from, agency decisions. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763(a) (2004) (grant-
ing Commonwealth Court exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of government agencies). 
 193. David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law Con-
stitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 889–90 (2003) (explaining role of concept of "natural right" 
in emergency of common-law judicial review of governmental decisions); see id. (constitutional review 
can occur even without a written constitution, as in Britain, where the common-law courts review ad-
ministrative agency decisions for violation of "natural right."). 
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trustee, the trustee often has more power and a reviewing court less when 
the trust documents is specific as to trustee powers and how they are to be 
exercised.194 
Moreover, practice in western democracies provides differing guid-
ance as to whether ordinary judicial bodies should perform constitutional 
review or whether bodies of a more political character—such as constitu-
tional courts—should perform that function.  Who shall decide constitu-
tional questions raises a basic question of political legitimacy.  It is not al-
ways clear, as the political culture of a state is being established, what is 
the most legitimate entity to decide constitutional questions.  The difficul-
ties of constitutional review in the international context have been explored 
in commentary relating to whether decisions by the U.N. Security Council 
should be subject to review by the International Court of Justice.195 
Arrangements for judicial review within an administrative law regime 
do not require a written constitution because delegations of authority to 
subordinate entities are necessarily written and reasonably specific.  Never-
theless, defining major features of the system of administrative law repre-
sent policy choices. 
In order to avoid most of the difficulties associated with constitutional 
review, this article focuses on administrative law review. Even if it is con-
cluded that the decisions of a top authority in a political trusteeship, such as 
the SRSG in Kosovo or the Administrator of the CPA in Iraq, should not be 
subject to review because they are thought of as inherently “emergency” in 
nature and thus within exceptions for judicial review recognized in most 
democracies,196 that does not mean that judicial review should not be avail-
able to ensure that decisions of subordinate governmental units comport 
with the basic law adopted by the political trustee.  In other words, admin-
istrative law review is desirable even if constitutional review is not. 
VI.  MODELS 
It is one thing to support the proposition that political trusteeships 
should make explicit provisions for administrative law review; it is another 
to explain how that should work institutionally, recognizing that a variety 
of arrangements can meet the need. 
 
 194. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) ("Trust principles make a 
deferential standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers."). 
 195. See generally Alvarez, supra note 3 (posing question in first sentence of article). 
 196. See infra Part VII.C..3 (discussing possibility of exempting emergency decisions from re-
view). 
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Although the theoretical bases for judicial review of agency action are 
different under the common law and continental traditions, the basic 
grounds for review are the same: to ensure that each agency decision is le-
gally authorized.  “[E]very exercise of power by an administrative authority 
may be brought before the courts for testing its validity.  The present legal 
position on the basis of judicial review of administrative action in Germany 
may have not been reached by the same route as in the common law but it 
is the same.”197  Deciding whether an agency decision is “authorized by 
law” necessitates review of constitutionality, review of statutory compe-
tence and its opposite, ultra vires action, review of decisional rationality, 
and review of procedural regularity and transparency.  These typically are 
considered under the rubric of “scope of review,” considered in Part VII.D. 
Practices in the European Union, Germany, France, Britain and the 
United States differ in the institutional structure for administrative law re-
view, but all these legal systems share some common features that can be 
extended to the political trusteeship context. 
A. European Union 
Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is a fundamental 
precept of European Law.198  The European Court of Justice199 has jurisdic-
tion to: 
review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament 
and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the 
ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the Euro-
pean Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third par-
ties . . . on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law 
relating to its application, or misuse of powers.”200 
The Court routinely exercises this power to hear claims asking it to 
“annul” administrative decisions by the European Commission on the 
 
 197. MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 124–
25 (2001). 
 198. Case T-348/94, Enso Española SA v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-1875, II-1901(1998) (re-
quirement for effective judicial review of any Commission decision that finds and punishes infringe-
ment of competition rules is general principle of Community law which follows from common constitu-
tional traditions of Member States). 
 199. The European Court of First Instance has similar jurisdiction.  The European Court of First 
Instance ("ECFI") was established in Article 222 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.  
CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, 
O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY].  Article 224 of the Consolidated Version of the EC 
Treaty provides "Unless the Statute of the Court of Justice provides otherwise, the provisions of this 
Treaty relating to the Court of Justice shall apply to the Court of First Instance." 
 200. Id. at 230. 
PERRITT.DOC 4/26/2005  4:29 PM 
2004] JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR DECISIONS BY POLITICAL TRUSTEES 43 
grounds of impermissible delegation of legislative authority,201 failure to 
afford an opportunity to be heard,202 and inadequate justification for deci-
sions.203 
B. France 
A result of the French Revolution was to interpret separation of pow-
ers as diminishing the role of the judiciary in public decision making.204  
Indeed, a 1790 statute provided, “it shall be a criminal offence for the 
judges of the ordinary courts to interfere in any manner whatsoever with 
the operation of the administration, nor shall they call administrators to ac-
count before them in respect of the exercise of their official functions.”205  
Such limitations on the role of the ordinary courts made it necessary to cre-
 
 201. See Case C-104/97, Atlanta AG v. Commission, 1999 E.C.R. I-6983, I-7033, I-7036–37 
(1999) (E.J.C. 1999) (Court of First Instance erroneously failed to consider argument that Council had 
unlawfully delegated legislative power to Commission, but Council defined power in sufficient detail 
that delegation was not unlawful). 
 202. See Case C-135/92, Fiskano AB v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. I-2885, I-I-2909–10 (1994) (an-
nulling decision of Commission because it did not afford affected party opportunity to submit observa-
tions on proposed action); Case T-156/94, Siderúrgica Aristrain Madrid, SL v. Commission, 1999 
E.C.R. II-645, para. 25 (1999) (Commission must afford procedural fairness in reaching decisions that 
may result in imposition of penalties); Arrêt du 14 mai 1998, Enso Española, 1998 E.C.R. at II-1900 (in 
making administrative decisions Commission must follow procedures that comport with fundamental 
notions of European law); but see Atlanta AG, 1999 E.C.R. at I-7035(declining to extend right to be 
heard to legislative proceedings) 
 203. See Case T-308/94, Cascades SA v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-925 (1998) (statement of 
reasons motivating Commission decision must be sufficiently clear and complete to enable a determine 
whether Commission decision was well founded); Case T-141/94, Thyssen Stahl AG v. Commission, 
1999 E.C.R. II-347, II-405–06 (1999) (Commission must develop record sufficient for judicial review, 
but need not reply to every argument or provide oral hearing on every basis for decision); Case T-11/89, 
Shell Int'l Chem. Co. v. Commission, [1992] E.C.R. II-757, para. 39–40 (1992) (documents and argu-
ments relied on by Commission must be part of record and available for observations by respondent). 
 204. Louis M. Aucoin, Judicial Review in France: Access of the Individual under French and 
European Law in the Aftermath of France's Rejection of Bicentennial Reform, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. 
L. REV. 443, 446 (1992) ("The supreme courts of pre-revolutionary France, the parlements, made them-
selves very unpopular by opposing all reforms to the traditional legal system."); Mike Bothwell, Nicolo 
and the Push to 1992—The Evolution of Judicial Review in France, 1990 BYU L. Rev. 1649, 1651 
(1990) ("In pre-Revolution France, the high courts used a form of substantive judicial review to protect 
their power base and control the more progressive legislation.  They used unwritten, fundamental laws 
and principles to preserve an extremely conservative power structure and way of thinking."); John 
Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 110 (1996) (judges in pre revolu-
tionary France, sitting on regional "Parlements," were "conscious members of an aristocracy of the 
robe," and interpreted royal reform legislation to deprive it of its intended effects); Martin A. Rogoff, A 
Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49 ME. L. REV. 21, 79 (1997) (char-
acterizing post revolutionary French approach as demeaning judges, portraying them as clerks, and re-
ducing judges to the bottom of the scale of prestige among legal professions); id. at 79 n.254 (popular 
distrust of judges led to diminishing post revolutionary role). 
 205. Rogoff, supra note 204 at 76, n.243. 
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ate a tribunal, the Conseil d’Etat, within the government to supervise the 
exercise of delegated authority.206 
The Conseil d’Etat is an administrative court that performs judicial re-
view functions quite similar to those performed by the regular courts in the 
United States, by administrative courts in Germany, and by the European 
Court of Justice. 
It is true that the administrative tribunals and the Conseil d’Etat are for-
mally separate from the (ordinary) judiciary and are formally part of the 
executive power.  It is also true that there are not called ‘courts’ and their 
members are not called ‘judges.’  Thus the separation of powers is for-
mally observed, while the legality of French executive/administrative 
acts receives the sort of ‘judicial’ review of legality that democratic jus-
tice everywhere requires.207 
The French constitutional tradition distinguishes sharply between pri-
vate and public law.  Administrative justice is a matter of public law and is 
enforced by a system of administrative courts entirely separate from the 
regular courts.  The administrative court system includes the tribunaux ad-
ministratifs, the trial courts, the cours administratives d’appel, and the Con-
seil d’Etat at the top.208  The Prime Minister of France serves as President 
of the Conseil d’Etat, and the Minister of Justice manages its daily af-
fairs.209  A similar arrangement exists in Sweden.210 
The Conseil d’Etat and its subordinate administrative courts exercise 
“full jurisdiction” (pleine jurisdiction) and “annulment jurisdiction” (juris-
diction d’annullation).211  Full jurisdiction resembles federal or state tort 
claims acts against the government.  Annulment jurisdiction encompasses 
challenges based on an assertion that the act performed by a government 
official exceeded the scope of the government’s jurisdiction, that it violated 
procedures required by law, or that it was exercised through an error of 
law.  Only administrative acts stemming from the legislative process or 
which involve relations between the French government and foreign sover-
eigns or international organizations are exempt from review.212 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Merryman, supra, note 204, at 111. 
 208. Farhad Ghaussy, Who Protects the Stranger? The French Dual Court System Confronts the 
Politics of Immigration: A Critique of the Tribunal des Conflits' Decision of May 12, 1997, 7 UCLA J. 
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 8 (2002) (describing French administrative court structure). 
 209. Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspec-
tive, 12 B.U. Int'l L.J. 57, 71 (1994). 
 210. See Sporrong & Lönnroth v. Sweden, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35, 45 (1982) (describing system of ad-
ministrative courts in Sweden). 
 211. Kublicki, supra note 209, at 68. 
 212. Id. at 67–68 (characterizing jurisdiction of French administrative courts). 
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The Conseil d’Etat and the subordinate administrative courts in France 
have developed general principles of law that allow invalidating executive 
acts considered to be an “excess of power.”213  The French administrative 
courts enforce the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.214 
The Conseil d’Etat has taken a broader view of its power to apply gen-
eral legal principles and to develop new legal principles than the regular 
courts in France.215  The Conseil d’Etat not only applies general principles 
of law; it also scrutinizes administrative decision making for compliance 
with the French Constitution.216  In 1989, the Conseil d’Etat reversed pre-
vious practice and held that administrative decisions must be reviewed for 
compliance with European law.217 
C. Germany 
Germany, like France, inherits a legal culture with considerable re-
spect for the capacity of the bureaucracy to make good policy and carry out 
law, a respect which makes it difficult to enlarge the role of ordinary courts 
in overseeing bureaucratic decision making.218  Post-revolutionary French 
mistrust of judicial review of administrative decisions was implanted by 
Napoleon’s conquest of the states that now comprise Germany.  French 
skepticism about judicial review was mitigated, however, by Anglo-
American ideas during the post World War II occupation.219  German law 
thus embodies a synthesis of French and Anglo-American approaches.  Re-
view of administrative decisions is unavailable in the regular courts.  A 
specialized system of administrative courts has exclusive jurisdiction over 
administrative agency decisions. 220  This follows the French model.  But 
 
 213. Aucoin, supra note 204, at 461. 
 214. Id. at 464. 
 215. Martin A. Rogoff, The French (R)evolution of 1958-1998, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 453, 456 n.13 
(1997/98). 
 216. Rogoff, supra note 204, at 76. 
 217. Bothwell, supra note 204, at 1659–60 (evaluating Raoul Georges Nicolo and Another, 1990 
CMLR 173). 
 218. Peter L. Lindseth, Comparing Administrative States: Susan Rose-Ackerman and the Limits of 
Public Law in Germany and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 589, 593–94 (1996) (characterizing 
German respect for bureaucracy). 
 219. SINGH, supra note 197, at 20–26 (delineating the historical development of German adminis-
trative courts). 
 220. Id. at 7–8 (identifying procedure where decisions of administrative courts cannot be ques-
tioned in other courts, but, unlike administrative tribunals in France, German administrative courts are 
part of the judiciary). 
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the administrative courts are part of the judiciary, not of the executive.  
This follows the English and American model. 
The German Administrative Court has the following jurisdiction:  
“Should any person’s rights be violated by public authority, recourse to the 
court shall be open to him.  If jurisdiction is not specified, recourse shall be 
to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction . . . .”221 
“Access to administrative courts shall be accorded in all public law 
disputes which are not of a constitutional nature to the extent that such dis-
putes are not expressly assigned to some other court under Federal law.”222 
German administrative courts are not altogether precluded from con-
sidering policy.  Not only can they review both law and facts in their inves-
tigation of administrative action, they can “replace an illegal administrative 
determination with one of their own.”223 
D. Britain and the United States 
Historically, judicial review in Great Britain arose as the common law 
courts avoided sovereign immunity by focusing their jurisdiction on subor-
dinate officers.224  In addition, the King’s Exchequer acted as an adminis-
trative court,225 and, for a time, the Privy Council and prerogative courts 
fulfilled the functions of the later French Conseil d’Etat.226  The common 
law courts used the writs of mandamus and certiorari to ensure that officers 
of the crown performed their legal duties and stayed within their delegated 
authority.227 
The placement of the judicial review function in the regular courts in 
England and the United States owes to a historic respect for the independ-
ence and universal power of regular courts to enforce natural justice, con-
trasted with the mistrust of regular courts in pre revolutionary France.  In 
Bonham’s case,228 according to Lord Coke, “when an Act of Parliament is 
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be per-
 
 221. Grundgesetz (Basic Law) art. 19(4) (F.R.G.); see generally SINGH, supra note 197, at 123 
(summarizing basis of judicial review of agency action under German law).  Article 95(1) of the Basic 
Law of Germany provides for a "Federal Administrative Court." 
 222. Code of Administrative Court Procedure § 40(1), as translated in SINGH, supra note 197, at 
323. 
 223. Lindseth, supra note 218, at 613 n.85. 
 224. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1963) (characterizing commentators on 17th and 18th century English practice). 
 225. Id. at 9. 
 226. Id. at 13. 
 227. Id. at 16. 
 228. 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610) (cited and quoted in Paul R. Verkuil, Cross-
currents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 689 (1986)). 
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formed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void.”229 
Natural justice review in England resembles due process review in the 
United States, except that natural justice review in England theoretically 
avoids review of policy decisions.230  In the United States, most administra-
tive law review is accomplished within the statutory framework of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.231  In Britain, the statutory framework is in-
complete.232 
VII.  PROPOSED SYSTEM FOR  
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN POLITICAL TRUSTEESHIPS 
It remains to synthesize from these models a possible system for ad-
ministrative law review in political trusteeships.  This design activity must 
recognize that political trusteeships are inherently extraordinary undertak-
ings.  The same relationship between governmental decisions and courts 
that would be acceptable in an ordinary government in the United States or 
Europe would be unsatisfactory for a political trusteeship.  The thresholds 
for intervention by reviewing bodies in a political trusteeship must be rela-
tively high and clearly defined.  The system must be set up to provide rela-
tively quick answers, so public administration is not paralyzed.  Substantial 
deference to political decisions by the political trustee must be assured. 
But none of these requirements forecloses administrative law review; 
it just means that its workings will not be the same as the U.S. Administra-
tive Procedure Act or its European counterparts. 
A. Basic Parameters for Administrative-law Review 
Any scheme for judicial review of agency action233 must carefully cir-
cumscribe the role of the reviewing body; otherwise the reviewer becomes 
the administrator.  Such circumscription is the product of the rules for 
standing, ripeness and exhaustion, explicit reservations of protective doc-
trines such as governmental immunity, and exemption of political questions 
and military and security decisions from review.  Then once such threshold 
requirements for review have been satisfied, the system must specify the 
 
 229. Verkuil, supra note 228, at 689 (quoting Bonham's case). 
 230. Charles H. Koch, Jr., "Some Kind of Hearing" in England, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 219, 250 
(1981). 
 231. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–702. 
 232. See Verkuil, supra note 228, at 706 (noting trend toward codification of administrative law 
review in England). 
 233. Consistent with its approach to APA analogies, the article uses the term "agency" to refer to 
the institutions of political trusteeships. 
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bases for which an administrative decision can be overturned or conversely 
upheld, including procedural irregularity and decisional irrationality. 
B. Standing, Ripeness and Exhaustion 
Systems for judicial review of agency action must define a threshold 
for agency decision making that triggers an entitlement to judicial review.  
One should not be entitled to formal review of the mere thoughts or unexe-
cuted intentions of an agency official; nor should one be entitled to review 
agency statements with no legal effect, or agency decisions that do not ad-
versely affect legal interests of the person seeking review.  It is helpful to 
think of this threshold requirement as embodying the same concepts ex-
pressed in the Article III requirements for ripeness and standing,234 and the 
prudential and explicit statutory requirement for exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. The same concepts are applied in European legal systems. 
The standing and ripeness inquiries require concrete injury to legally 
recognized interests.  Concreteness of the injury is largely a question of 
fact.  A scheme for judicial review should identify the kinds of legal inter-
ests that, when infringed by agency action, entitle the holder of those inter-
ests to judicial review. 235  “Only measures producing binding legal effects 
affecting the interest of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in 
his legal position, are acts and decisions capable of the being the subject of 
an action for annulment within the meaning of Article 230.”236  Decisions 
by European institutions to commence legal proceedings in national courts 
do not have sufficiently concrete effects in and of themselves to be review-
able.237 
Merely because a legally protected interest has been detrimentally af-
fected by agency action does not mean, of course, that the reviewing au-
 
 234. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 n.10 (1975) (explaining relationship among Article 
III justiciability and ripeness and standing requirements). 
 235. The APA embraces this approach.  "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, 
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled 
to judicial review thereof."  5 U.S.C. § 702.  "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."  Id. 
§ 704.  The APA makes no attempt to enumerate types of "final agency action."  Substantial case law 
has developed, however, on what qualifies as "legal wrong" and "adversely affected or aggrieved."  The 
Supreme Court interpreted the "adversely affected" branch of this section to allow review when a party 
seeking review can show adverse effect to interests within the zone protected by the statute under which 
he seeks review.  Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159, 174 (1970). 
 236. Case C-208/03 P-R, Le Pen v. Parliament, 2003 E.C.R. I-07939, para.92 (2003) (dismissing 
petition for interim relief). 
 237. Case T-377/00, Philip Morris Int'l, Inc. v. Commission, [2003] E.C.R. II-1. para. 79 (2003). 
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thority should reverse the agency action.  The action may be justified and 
therefore legally permissible. 
Standing also requires that the person suffering the legal injury be the 
one to seek review.  Third party intermeddling is not encouraged.  The 
ripeness and exhaustion doctrines relate to timing and inter-institutional re-
spect.  If the reviewing institution declines jurisdiction until the matter in 
controversy has been thoroughly addressed by the governmental body to be 
reviewed, interference in public administration is minimized.  Basic con-
cepts of ripeness, standing and exhaustion should be applied to administra-
tive law review of political trusteeship decisions. 
Applying these threshold barriers to review requires considering both 
the kinds of agency actions or decisions that may trigger reviewability and 
identifying the kinds of legal interests that, when infringed by agency ac-
tion, entitle the holder of those interests to judicial review. 238 
1. Agency actions and decisions.  A typology of agency actions or 
decisions that might trigger judicial review includes:   
Obviously, imposition of monetary fines and incarceration should be 
prima facie reviewable. 
A taking of property.  Examples might include vesting a privatization 
agency with complete control over property apparently owned or lawfully 
occupied by a natural or artificial person.  Even if the mere granting of the 
power did not trigger reviewability, the exercise of the power in concrete 
cases might warrant review. 
Withdrawing or withholding a privilege or power.  This would include 
action by a political trustee to deny a radio frequency to a private entity that 
wants to offer Internet connection services through wireless technologies; 
or a protest of UNMIK selection of Alcatel as the cell phone operator, in 
contravention of a decision by PTK to select Siemens, after a careful tender 
process under the authority explicitly delegated by UNMIK earlier.239  It 
could also include a denial of permission by a privatization agency240 for a 
socially owned enterprise to sell stock or lease its assets to a foreign inves-
tor. 
 
 238. The APA embraces both approaches.  See supra text accompanying note 235. 
 239. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/12 § 1, UNMIK/REG/1999/12 (Oct. 14, 1999) (giving PTK 
authority to administer postal and telecommunication facilities), available at 
http://www/unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_12.pdf. 
 240. KTA is an UNMIK entity.  See UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 § 1. 
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Refusing to devolve power to local institutions.241  It could include re-
fusal by a political trustee to transfer power to allow a municipality to grant 
a permit to erect a facility on land apparently owned by the municipality.242  
It also might include refusal by political trustee to approve a statute 
adopted by an elected local assembly.  In this category of decisions and ac-
tions, it is important to understand that a failure to decide or failure to act 
can be just as harmful as affirmative decisions or actions,243 as considered 
in greater depth in Part VII.B.2. 
Many of the controversies that have cropped up in Kosovo relate to 
the first category, including the very slow pace of creating the framework 
for privatization of socially owned enterprises, accompanied by conflicting 
efforts to privatize the Sharr Cement Plant and UNMIK blockage of early 
post-war efforts by locals—especially former KLA—to occupy and restart 
enterprises.  Controversies also arise from frustrated efforts to open restau-
rants or other small businesses, when municipalities decline to grant li-
censes or permits for months or years without explanation. 
2. Refusals to act.  Refusals by governmental bodies to exercise 
their powers can be as harmful as affirmatively acting.  Accordingly, any 
system for administrative law review in the political trusteeship context 
should allow review of failures or refusals to act in some circumstances. 
United States administrative law distinguishes policy-based decisions 
to withhold agency action from refusals to act in contravention of explicit 
legal duty.  In Heckler v. Chaney,244 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that the refusal of the federal Food and Drug Administration to 
commence an enforcement action was not subject to judicial review.245  
The Court established a presumption that refusals to engage in enforcement 
action are not reviewable under the APA.246  One can distinguish political 
trustee refusals to act in terms of broad policy and legislative action be-
cause the Heckler court relied in substantial part on the traditional judicial 
 
 241. Respectable arguments exist that such decisions should be unreviewable "political decisions," 
as considered in Part VII.C.1. 
 242. The text uses the word "apparently" because property ownership in Kosovo is extremely con-
fused and complicated.  See ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE MISSION 
IN KOSOVO, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KOSOVO 2002-2003 3 (June 30, 2003) (explaining complexity of 
property law in Kosovo under U.N. administration), available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/06/974_en.pdf. 
 243. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (reviewing court shall "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unrea-
sonably delayed"). 
 244. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 245. Id. at 837–38. 
 246. Id. 
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abstention with respect to prosecutorial discretion.247  For example, in 
American Horse Protection Association v. Lyng,248 the court of appeals, re-
versing the district court, distinguished Chaney and held that denial by an 
agency of a petition to engage in rulemaking are reviewable under the APA 
to determine if they are arbitrary and capricious.249  In particular, it held 
that the reviewing court should “assure itself that the agency considered the 
relevant factors, that it explained the ‘facts and policy concerns’ relied on, 
and that the facts have some basis in the record.”250 
The French Conseil d’Etat in principle refuses to order administrative 
agencies to act, but, on occasion, is willing to enjoin agency refusals to per-
form legal obligations.251 
These French and American approaches are appropriate starting points 
for a system of administrative law review for political trusteeships.  They 
began by allowing the governmental body to make the resource-allocation 
and policy decisions incident to commencing an enforcement proceeding or 
beginning to write a legislative rule.  On the other hand, they leave the door 
open for review in irrational or other egregious cases. 
Also, refusing to act timely on a permit or license requirement pre-
sents different issues from refusing to promulgate a rule or to commence an 
enforcement decisions.  License and permit decisions should be subject to 
greater scrutiny. 
3. The nature of the legal claim.  Judicial intervention to block or to 
revise governmental action surely is not appropriate unless the governmen-
tal decision is somehow “unlawful.”  Beyond identifying a concrete agency 
decision that the challenger objects to, she also should be required to spec-
ify a legally recognized interest belonging to the challenger which the gov-
ernmental act affects.  She should have to demonstrate a “legal wrong.” 
Sometimes an administrative agency decision is not concretely effec-
tive until the agency goes to court to enforce it.  This inevitably is the case 
when some sort of physical compulsion is necessary to enforce the agency 
decision, as when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration seeks 
contempt penalties for refusal to allow inspection pursuant to an adminis-
 
 247. See id. at 832–33. 
 248. 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 249. Id. at 4. 
 250. Id. at 5.  But see Nat'l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass'n v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 103 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (declining to overturn denial of a petition for a rule; Lyng involved a clearer statutory 
duty to regulate; agency gave adequate reasons for its refusal to regulate). 
 251. Norman S. Marsh, Interim Orders Against the State: A Comparative Note, 6/7 T. CIV. L.F. 
263, 266–67 (1991–92). 
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trative “warrant.”  It also may be the case if an agency imposes monetary 
penalties and the penalized entity does not voluntarily pay.  Whenever ju-
dicial enforcement of an agency order is part of the regular process, the en-
forcing court is placed in a position from which it easily can review the 
agency’s decision.252 
But other administrative agency decisions, for example, denial or can-
cellation of a privilege such as a license, are complete once the agency de-
cides.  (Of course, subsequent judicial involvement may occur if the party 
denied or losing a license is charged with operating without a license.)  In 
those instances, judicial review is available only if some justiciable legal 
claim, traditionally nominated a “cause of action,” exists.  At common law 
there were a number of such causes of action: Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, 
Prohibition, and Injunction.253  Now, under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, Section 702 of Title 5 expressly grants a right of action.  Significantly, 
this statutory grant includes not only a prerequisite of legal injury,254 but 
also a broader kind of standing.  In Camp v. Data Processing Associa-
tion,255 the Supreme Court of the United States made it clear the legal in-
quiry under this section includes concrete injury to legal interests recog-
nized in statutes setting up the administrative agency. 
Such a formulation is relatively straightforward and non-controversial 
in an established legal system.  Judicial review of agency action occurs in 
the context of a broad array of previously recognized legal rights256 and of 
an additional set of interests recognized as protectable by statutes, usually 
fairly closely related to the statutes creating the agency framework.  But de-
fining the interests to be protected by the judicial review process in politi-
cal trusteeship context is more difficult.  On the one hand, it seems rea-
sonably clear that personal rights generally recognized in national legal 
systems qualify for protection against agency deprivation in any system of 
 
 252. Compare Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (rejecting judicial 
review of representation decision under Railway Labor Act) with Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) 
(allowing for limited judicial review of representation decision under National Labor Relations Act). 
 253. See Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1051 (D. Ariz. 2001) (noting 
common law writs), vacated on other grounds by, 305 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 254. 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial re-
view thereof."). 
 255. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
 256. The "legal wrong" phrase in 5 U.S.C. § 702 contemplates injury to a common-law right, or to 
a statutory or constitutional right recognized independently of the agency regime in controversy. See 
Benson v. City of Minneapolis, 286 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D. Minn. 1968). The European Court of Human 
Rights exercises jurisdiction to determine that administrative orders, such as those incident to expro-
priation, violate the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. Sporrong, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 54 (finding 
that Swedish "expropriation permits" violated art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR). 
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judicial review.257  At the same time, it seems equally obvious that the po-
litical trustee should be free to supplant preexisting local law that violates 
generally recognized international standards, such as human rights princi-
ples.  This is what UNMIK did after some initial missteps with the Mil-
osevic-era Yugoslav laws aimed at discriminating against Albanians.258  
Such preemption should not be subject to blocking by the judicial review 
process.  The legislature should be able to change the law.259 
At a minimum, in a political trusteeship, a person seeking review 
should be required to show that the interests he seeks to protect are interests 
that are recognized by some relevant legal regime,260 and that it is consis-
tent with the broad policies and purposes of the political trusteeship to al-
low judicial review premised on infringement of those interests.  Unless the 
political trustee has preempted the source of law asserted, the petition for 
review should be deemed to satisfy the legal-wrong requirement. 
C. Sovereign Immunity and Related Doctrines 
Political trustees, like other sovereigns, should be entitled to some 
measure of immunity against legal liability.  Defining the boundaries and 
exceptions to this immunity is central to determining the scope of adminis-
trative law review. 
When the United Nations is in charge of the trusteeship, the argument 
for immunity is strong.261  The United Nations, its subordinate components, 
and its officers enjoy absolute immunity under the United Nations Conven-
tion on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.262  Article VIII of 
the treaty obligates the U.N. to establish dispute resolution mechanisms for 
contract and “other private law claims” and claims against U.N. officials263 
 
 257. Special Report No. 1, supra note 27, at para. 24. 
 258. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/59, UNMIK/REG/2000/59 (October 22, 2000) (amending 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg.59.00.htm. 
 259. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281–82 (1980) (validating power of state legislature to 
modify common-law rules); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989) (applying 
"basic rule that the legislature may alter the common law"). 
 260. In that regard, the conceptual discussion in the commentary to Restatement (Second) of Tort § 
870 may be useful: "The use of the term, injury, in this Section means that the harm must be to a legally 
protected interest of the plaintiff.  Recovery is thus limited to those cases in which the plaintiff's harm is 
of such a nature and seriousness that legal redress is appropriate."  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 870 cmt. e (1979). 
 261. See Part III.A.2.a (discussing U.N. immunity in the context of possible national-court litiga-
tion over trustee decisions). 
 262. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities, supra note 60, at art. II, § 2. 
 263. Id. at art. III, § 29 provides: 
"The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: 
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and empowers the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes over 
the treaty itself.264 
But, as when an international organization governs a territory, the ap-
propriateness of absolute immunity is questionable.  The Ombudsperson in 
Kosovo examined the rationale for grants of immunity in international law 
and concluded that the exercise of governmental powers by the U.N. in 
Kosovo fell outside this rationale.  “[T]he main purpose of granting immu-
nity to international organizations is to protect them against the unilateral 
interference by the individual government of the state in which they are lo-
cated, a legitimate objective to ensure the effective operation of such or-
ganizations . . . .”265  It concluded that this rationale did not apply to 
UNMIK, which “in fact acts as a surrogate state.  It follows that the under-
lying purpose of a grant of immunity does not apply as there is no need for 
a government to be protected against itself.” 266  It observed that “no de-
mocratic state operating under the rule of law accords itself total immunity 
from any administrative, civil or criminal responsibility.”267 
It concluded that, because “the fundamental precept of the rule of law 
is that the executive and legislative authorities are bound by the law and are 
not above it,”268 the exercise of legislative and executive power by UNMIK 
“must be subject to the oversight of the judiciary, as the arbiter of legality 
in a democratic society.” 269 
In other words, some form of judicial review is inherent in the “rule of 
law.”  Waiving or limiting immunity for certain types of governmental de-
cisions suitable for review by another body does not foreclose the possibil-
ity that some other types of decisions should remain immune.  A number of 
 
 
(a)  disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the 
United Nations is a party; 
 
(b)  disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official posi-
tion enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General. 
 264. Id. at art. VIII, § 30 provides: 
All differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present convention shall 
be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the parties 
to have recourse to another mode of settlement.  If a difference arises between the United Na-
tions on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advi-
sory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and 
Article 65 of the Statute of the Court.  The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as 
decisive by the parties. 
 265. Special Report No. 1, supra note 27, at para. 23. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 24. 
 269. Id. 
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models exist for demarking such a safe haven for political trustee decisions: 
political questions, military decisions in the field, and emergencies, espe-
cially those involving public security. 
1. Political question.  The political question doctrine270 exempts 
from judicial review decisions by the President and other senior officers of 
the Executive Branch and by the Congress that are committed to the discre-
tion of those officers by the Constitution or statute271 and with respect to 
which the courts have no judicially manageable standards272 for review.273  
The force of the doctrine is especially strong when foreign affairs274 or na-
tional security matters275 are involved.  Nevertheless, even in the foreign 
affairs arena, decisions that raise questions about the interpretation of rea-
 
 270. A controversy is nonjusticiable—i.e., involves a political question—where there is "a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  But the 
courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and determine whether and to what extent 
the issue is textually committed.  See id.; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969).  "As the 
discussion that follows makes clear, the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political de-
partment is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclu-
sion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch."  Nixon v. United States, 
506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (holding Senate choice of procedures to try impeachment of federal judge 
was a non-reviewable political question). 
 271. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1994) (holding exercise of Presidential discretion to 
close military bases not reviewable under APA as it was political in nature). 
 272. Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2001) (declining to hear challenge to 
agricultural policy under political question doctrine). 
 273. Id. at 1175 ("Courts are ill-equipped to make highly technical, complex, and on-going deci-
sions regarding how to maintain market conditions, negotiate trade agreements, and control currency"; 
denying, under political question doctrine, Tucker Act claim that government failed to establish favor-
able market conditions for small farmers); Kwan v. United States, 272 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(discussing political question doctrine). 
 274. Kwan, 272 F.3d at 1364 (Tucker Act claim by Korean citizen for benefits presented non-
justiciable political question because it involved foreign affairs function and negotiations between the 
governments of the United States and Korea); see 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consultate Gen. of Social-
ist Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, 218 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal, under political 
question doctrine, of claim that successor states of former Yugoslavia were liable for rent obligations 
incurred by Yugoslavia). 
 275. Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2001) (political 
question doctrine foreclosed judicial review of FAA decision to reserve airspace for military operations; 
rejecting application of APA requirements for rulemaking).  See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1149 (decisions 
by military custodian of alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay were not judicially reviewable under APA 
because committed to agency discretion by law; emphasizing capture on military field of battle and 
military nature of confinement). 
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sonably specific textual requirements of treaties or other primary sources of 
law may be reviewable.276 
In the political trusteeship context, the political question doctrine 
would shield from review fundamental decisions of the top officials by a 
political trusteeship with respect to the structure of local government and 
the pace with which power should be devolved from the trustee to local in-
stitutions.  Such decisions almost certainly would be committed to the dis-
cretion of the top officials, and the exercise of that discretion would involve 
no judicially manageable standards. 
On the other hand, once the top officials of a political trusteeship 
delegate power to subordinate officials and institutions, the text of the 
delegation instruments and the conduct of the persons to whom power is 
delegated narrow the scope for discretion and also provide standards ascer-
tainable from the texts.  As the level of the administrative decision de-
clines, the appropriateness of judicial review increases. 
For example, whether to embark on a program of privatization should 
fall well within the political question doctrine.  Once a decision to privatize 
is made, however, decisions by privatization agencies that violate their own 
rules or that exceed the authority delegated to them should be reviewable. 
It should not be difficult to design a system of judicial review within a 
political trusteeship that shapes application of the political question doc-
trine by explicit language regarding discretion. 
2. Military and security decisions.  The U.S. Administrative Proce-
dure Act excludes from its judicial review provisions “military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”277  This ex-
presses part of a broader doctrine278 which requires courts to abstain from 
deciding questions within the national security or foreign affairs function of 
the President.279 
In the political trustee context, the question would be whether deci-
sions by subordinate officials of a civil administration qualify as (1) mili-
 
 276. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (political question 
doctrine did not bar judicial review of cabinet officers application of treaty requirement, presenting 
purely legal question of statutory interpretation). 
 277. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (b)(1)(G) (excluding from definition of "agency" those authorities).  See Al 
Odah  321 F.3d at 1149 (stating that the APA did not waive sovereign immunity for alien detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay because of military function exception to definition of agency; emphasizing capture 
on military field of battle and military nature of confinement). 
 278. See infra Part VII.C.1 (discussing political question doctrine). 
 279. See Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 711 (discussing need to keep courts out of foreign relations matters); 
Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[w]hen it comes to matters touch-
ing on national security or foreign affairs . . . the presumption of review 'runs aground'"). 
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tary authority, (2) exercised in the field, (3)(a) in time of war, or (3)(b) in 
occupied territory.  The military exemption of the APA does not apply to 
all military decisions;280 nor does it apply to decisions that are not military 
in character and that do not involve the military chain of command.281  It is 
certainly possible to distinguish decisions by civilians282 involved in civil 
administration, even in occupied territory, although the language of the 
proviso is interpreted broadly.283  Constitutional jurisprudence in the United 
States distinguishes between the role of civil courts with respect to purely 
military matters and other matters arguably related to military operations.284 
Given the limitation of the textual exclusion from judicial review of 
military decisions, and the case law, it should be possible to structure judi-
cial review in a political trusteeship to avoid interference with military de-
cisions.  Review of orders of a military character by military commanders 
to their military subordinates should be excluded from review.  Decisions 
to conduct security or operations by military personnel should be excluded 
as well, with possible coverage for conduct resulting in unnecessary dam-
age to persons or structures.  Conversely, decisions by civilians below the 
 
 280. Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that APA § 701(b)(1)(G) 
allowed individual challenges to military decisions if action challenged was not "exercised in the field 
in time of war or in occupied territory;" but declining to review Navy's decision not to award medal 
because no statutory standards under section 701(a)(2)). 
 281. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding § 701(b)(1)(G) inapplicable 
because plaintiff was not seeking review of military commands "made in combat zones or in prepara-
tion for, or in the aftermath of, battle;" nor was he seeking to interfere in relationship between military 
personnel and superior officers; but challenged FDA regulation was valid). 
 282. Cf. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F. Supp. 2d 119, 128 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting injunction against 
involuntary anthrax vaccinations because challenged order came from Secretary of Defense not by field 
commanders, and challenge did not focus on military authority exercised in field). 
 283. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 64 n.11 (D.D.C. 2002) (challenges to confinement of 
enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay as not within APA's sovereign immunity because subjects were 
captured on field of battle and § 701(b)(1)(G) thus applied). 
 284. See generally Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1986) (holding that civilian cannot be tried and 
sentenced by military tribunal when civil courts are open and functioning).  Another court has stated: 
It may be true that no one, whatever his station or occupation, can there interfere with or ob-
struct any of the measures deemed essential for the success of the army, without subjecting 
himself to immediate arrest and summary punishment.  The ordinary laws of the land are 
there superseded by the laws of war.  The jurisdiction of the civil magistrate is there sus-
pended, and military authority and force are substituted.  The success of the army is the con-
trolling consideration, and to that every thing else is required to bend.  To secure that success, 
persons may be arrested and confined, and property taken and used or destroyed, at the com-
mand of the general, he being responsible only to his superiors for an abuse of his authority.  
His orders, from the very necessity of the case, there constitute legal justification for any ac-
tion of his officers and men.  This martial rule—in other words, this will of the commanding 
general, except in the country of the enemy occupied and dominated by the army—is limited 
to the field of military operations.  In a country not hostile, at a distance from the movements 
of the army, where they cannot be immediately and directly interfered with, and the courts are 
open, it has no existence. 
Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 293–94 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting). 
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top level of the political trusteeship related to their civil administration 
functions can be subject to review, consistent with the spirit and interpreta-
tion of the military exemption of the APA and its counterparts in other ad-
ministrative law review systems. 
3. Emergencies.  While the judicial review provisions of the APA 
contain no exception for emergency decisions by agencies, statutes delegat-
ing authority to agencies often contain explicit or implied grants of discre-
tion to take emergency action.285  Moreover, the rulemaking provisions of 
the APA do contain an exception to the usual procedural requirements 
when the agency, for good cause, finds that adhering to the procedures 
would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”286 
Any framework for judicial review of the decisions of political trus-
tees should contain an explicit exemption for emergency decisions, al-
though post-hoc review of the basis for the determination of emergency 
may be appropriate. 
D. Standards for Review 
For decisions satisfying threshold requirements for reviewability, any 
system for administrative review must include standards pursuant to which 
the reviewing entity should overturn decisions or, alternatively, respect 
them. 
At its most general, any system of administrative review must assure 
that governmental decisions are authorized by law, that they are rational, 
and that they have been arrived at through fair procedure.  In the political 
trustee context, as in the conventional administrative agency context, the 
political trustee should be able to demonstrate three propositions: first, that 
the action taken or decision made by the trustee was authorized by law; 
second, that it was rationally related 287 to a legitimate state interest, the 
protection of which was within the trustee’s mandate;288  and, third, that the 
decision was reached through appropriate procedures. 
The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, in Section 706 of Title 5, 
provides a good checklist for standards of review.  It expresses standards of 
 
 285. See Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 605 F.2d 1016, 1021 n.6 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (deferring to administrative a statutory grant of discretion to determine if emergency existed 
what emergency measures were appropriate; no judicial review). 
 286. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), 2d para. (B). 
 287. The burden is on the agency to establish the rationality of its decision.  Rationality essentially 
means logical connection between articulated policy principles and factual propositions, on the one 
hand, and the conclusions drawn, on the other. 
 288. This rationality standard is developed more fully in Part VII.D.2. 
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review also used for administrative law review in other legal systems.289  
While judicial review of political-trustee decisions may involve specific 
standards different from those developed by American courts under the 
APA, the basic touchstones of review should be the same. 
1. Requiring authority for the decision.  In the United States, the 
Delegation Doctrine290 expresses a fundamental precept of administrative 
law: the idea the subordinate government officials may act legitimately 
only within the scope of powers delegated to them.291  “[T]he whole politi-
cal system is founded on the idea, that the departments of government are 
the agents of the nation, and will perform, within their respective spheres, 
the duties assigned to them.”292  “[G]overnment officials act as agents con-
strained by their delegated authority.”293  Reasonably implied by this idea is 
that the agent must not be the sole judge of whether an act falls within the 
scope of the agency.294 
Section 706 (2)(C) requires that agency decisions not be ultra vires; in 
other words, that they be within in the authority or competence granted the 
agency.  The same basic concepts are employed in other legal systems.  
Reviewing agency decisions on claims that they are ultra vires has been 
 
 289. The sections analyzing specific standards of review infra cite examples courts from other legal 
systems applying the standard. 
 290. The "Delegation Doctrine" in American administrative law expresses the proposition that the 
legislative power cannot be delegated to someone who is not legally accountable to those who are im-
mediately accountable politically (the members of the legislature).  From an initial—an unrealistic—
position that legislative power cannot be delegated at all, the doctrine has evolved into a flexible basis 
for judicial review, insisting that the legislature provide reasonably ascertainable standards to confine 
the activities and authority of the delegatee, and that the delegatee remain within those limits. 
  More ambitious extension of the doctrine to the U.N. context would invalidate Security Coun-
cil delegation of the power not accompanied by reasonably ascertainable standards, but that would re-
quire much more heroic discovery of a source of law superior to Security Council's broad authority in 
the UN charter, and reversal of the holding in the Lockerbie cases by the International Court of Justice, 
that it lacks authority to review Security Council decisions.  See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 1 n.1 (citing 
and summarizing Lockerbie litigation and its connection to power of ICJ to consider claims that Secu-
rity Council decisions were ultra vires).  By analogy, the doctrine would examine UNMIK action to 
ensure that it remains within the confines set by Security Council Resolution 1244. 
 291. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (characterizing modern understanding 
of Delegation Doctrine; upholding delegation of authority to President to determine factors to be con-
sidered in criminal sentencing).  "It does not suffice to say that Congress announced its will to delegate 
certain authority.  Congress as a general rule must also 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible prin-
ciple to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.'" Id. at 771. 
 292. Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1468 (2000) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall). 
 293. Id. (characterizing John Locke). 
 294. Id. at 1469. 
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characterized as “the central principle of administrative law” in Britain.295  
The French Conseil d’Etat can reverse administrative decisions for incom-
petence or want of authority.296  The European Court of Justice scrutinizes 
delegated legislative authority for judicially-reviewable standards con-
straining the exercise of the delegated power.297 
Any system for administrative law review of political-trustee deci-
sions should incorporate a requirement that agency decisions be validated 
only if they fall within authority delegated to the agency.  The agency 
should bear the burden of identifying the source of law that authorizes a 
challenged decision. 
This would permit the reviewing body to invalidate a political trustee 
decision contravening limitations expressed in basic grants to authority to 
the political trustee, such as Security Council Resolution 1244, in the case 
of Kosovo.  It also would require invalidation of lower level decisions that 
violate delegations of authority or legislative acts by top-level political 
trustee authority.  It is well established that agencies must follow their own 
rules.298 
Section 706(2)(B) of the APA prohibits agency decisions that contra-
vene constitutional limitations.299  The equivalent in the political trustee 
context would be a trustee decision that violates the mandate of the politi-
cal trusteeship, the U.N. charter, or provisions of human rights documents 
such as the Convention on Civil and Political Rights.  This branch of re-
viewability authorizes invalidating agency action that contravenes a supe-
rior source of law even though it may be consistent with the legal text that 
is the source of the agency’s authority. 
2. Requiring that decisions be rational: what constitutes justifica-
tion?  All systems of administrative law review require that agency deci-
sions be rational; they differ on the degree to which reviewing courts defer 
 
 295. Id. at 1470 (quoting Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairytales: The Ultra Vires Doc-
trine, the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review, 55 Cambridge L. J. 122 (1996)). 
 296. Kurt J. Hamrock, The ELSI Case: Toward an International Definition of "Arbitrary" Conduct, 
27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 837, 852–53 (1992) (arguing that French ultra vires review is roughly the same as 
ultra vires review in the United States). 
 297. See supra text accompanying note 201. 
 298. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2003) (having chosen to 
promulgate policy, agency must follow it); Hamel v. Johnson, 25 P.3d 314, 326 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("It 
is axiomatic that administrative agencies must follow their own rules."). 
 299. This overlaps with constitutional review to the extent that a constitutional challenge to an 
agency decision is premised on a constitutional attack on the statute giving the agency authority. 
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to agency judgments on matters of fact,300 policy considerations,301 and in-
terpretations of law.302  Merely because a legally protected interest has been 
detrimentally affected by agency action does not mean that the reviewing 
authority should reverse the agency action.  The action may be justified303 
and, therefore, legally permissible. 
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA requires that agency decision not be ar-
bitrary and capricious.  This is a rationality requirement.  The burden is on 
the agency to establish the rationality of its decision.  Rationality essen-
tially means logical connection between articulated policy principles and 
factual propositions, on the one hand, and the conclusions drawn, on the 
other.  This principle is the substantive review touchstone for quasi legisla-
tive decision making rulemaking.  It also applies, however, to decisions not 
channeled through formal procedures, such as a decision where to build a 
highway.304  The agency must disclose its reasoning and other bases for its 
decision.305 
Reviewing and invalidating decisions found to be arbitrary and capri-
cious is a feature of French, Italian, and, arguably, general international 
 
 300. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (reviewing court must 
be especially deferential when agency decisions represent expert determinations of scientific fact). 
 301. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (reviewing court should de-
fer to agency policy judgments when agency interprets its own regulations). 
 302. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(reviewing court is final authority on what law means, but should defer to reasonable interpretations of 
authorizing statute when legislature intended to leave policy discretion to agency). 
 303. The Restatement of Torts explains the concept of justification in the tort context.  "Tort law 
involves a balancing of the conflicting interests of the litigants in the light of the social and economic 
interests of society in general."  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. c (1979).  Interests pro-
moted by the actor's conduct "are the ones that have become the basis for established privileges.  Thus 
protection of oneself becomes self-defense and protection of property becomes the privilege of defense 
of possession or recapture.  The importance of these interests to the owner and to society is a significant 
factor in the balancing process."  Id. cmt. g (allowing prima facie injury if justification by defendant is 
established). 
 304. "[Judicial] review is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary 
at the time he made his decision . . . in order to determine if the Secretary acted within the scope of his 
authority and if the Secretary's action was justifiable under the applicable standard."  Citizens to Pres. 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (1974) (remanding for development of better record in challenge to deci-
sion to build highway through park). 
 305. "Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on fac-
tors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, 
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise.  The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply 
a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given."  Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n, 
463 U.S. at 43 (overturning, as arbitrary and capricious, agency decision to rescind regulation). 
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law.306  Such an arbitrary and capricious test invalidates agency action if (1) 
the action is not authorized by law, (2) the action is taken for an improper 
purpose, (3) the action is taken because of irrelevant circumstances, or (4) 
the action is patently unreasonable.307  In the European Union, the ECJ de-
fers to general factual findings by European institutions in complex mat-
ters, as long as they do not contain manifest error, constitute a misuse of 
power or exceed the bounds of the discretion conferred on the institution.  
Thus the court defers substantially to policy judgments.308 
In the political trustee context, agencies should be obligated to justify 
the content of their regulations under this standard, as well as their deci-
sions in individual cases.  The obligation extends, perhaps in weakened 
form,309 to justification of other administrative and policy decisions, includ-
ing a decision not to issue a regulation, not to grant a license, or not to 
delegate authority to a local institution.  Reviewing the last kind of deci-
sion, a decision not to delegate authority to a local institution, is the most 
challenging type of review because it seems entirely discretionary.310  But 
in the U.S. APA context, at least one United States court of appeals has 
held that some decisions not to act by agencies are reviewable under the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard.311  The Supreme Court has rejected the 
proposition that a basic change in policy preference is immune from re-
view.312 
In the political trustee context, as in the conventional administrative 
agency context, justification should require that the agency demonstrate 
two propositions: first, that the action taken or decision made by the agency 
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the protection of which 
was within the agency’s mandate.  In Kosovo, for example, the first ele-
ment of justification for UNMIK decisions should relate to the purposes 
identified or reasonably inferable from Security Council Resolution 1244.  
 
 306. See generally Hamrock, supra note 296 (analyzing Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. 
Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20)). 
 307. Id. at 852 (suggesting four elements of English arbitrary and capricious review, and arguing 
that French Conseil d'Etat precedent embraces the same elements); Id. at 853 (arguing that Italian ad-
ministrative law embraces same elements). 
 308. See generally Case 138/79, SA Roquette Freres v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333 (1980) (discuss-
ing the courts reliance on agricultural policy of the Community). 
 309. See infra Part VII.B.2, considering review of agency refusal to act. 
 310. It thus may fall within the political question exemption from review, discussed in Part VII.C.1. 
 311. See Lyng, 812 F.2d at 6 (stating that reasons given by agency for denying petition to amend 
rules were insufficient). 
 312. See Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 41–42 (suggesting that standard for reviewing deci-
sion not to promulgate rule is more deferential than standard for reviewing decision to promulgate or to 
rescind rule—possibly "close to the borderline of nonreviewability." 
PERRITT.DOC 4/26/2005  4:29 PM 
2004] JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR DECISIONS BY POLITICAL TRUSTEES 63 
More broadly, interests recognized in the charter of the U.N. should be ad-
missible in this branch of the inquiry. 
3. Requiring that decisions be made through adequate procedures: 
what procedures are required by law?  Administrative law review requires 
scrutiny of the processes leading up to the agency’s decision or action and 
assessment of them against the benchmark provided by generally accepted 
principles of procedural fairness.  Procedural requirements can be imposed 
on administrative decision making by testing the procedures actually used 
in a particular case against relatively general concepts of due process,313 or 
they can be imposed by codes or statutes prescribed in advance as under the 
U.S. Administrative Procedure Act.314 
Those principles are incorporated into the concept of procedural due 
process.315  English, American, and continental European concepts of pro-
cedural due process include: notice of the action or decision proposed,316 an 
opportunity to present reasons why the action should not be taken,317 an 
impartial decision maker, an opportunity to present witnesses, professional 
counsel, a statement of the grounds for the decision, referring to arguments 
made by the person opposing the decision,318 the possibility of review,319 
and public access to the proceeding.320  Selection of these elements of pro-
cedural fairness depends on the factors defining a specific case.321 
 
 313. See Enso Española, 1998 E.C.R. at II-1900 (1998) (in making administrative decisions Com-
mission must follow procedures that comport with fundamental notions of European law); Siderúrgica 
Aristrain, 1999 E.C.R. at para. 25 (Commission must afford procedural fairness in reaching decisions 
that may result in imposition of penalties). 
 314. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–58. 
 315. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 (termination of welfare benefits by state agency requires adher-
ence to procedural due process). 
 316. See supra text accompanying note 203. 
 317. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
 318. See supra text accompanying note 203. 
 319. See Enso Española, 1998 E.C.R. at ¶ 2  (requirement for effective judicial review of any 
Commission decision that finds and punishes infringement of competition rules is general principle of 
Community law which follows from common constitutional traditions of Member States).  See gener-
ally  Koch, supra note 230, at 246-247 (noting strong presumption of judicial reviewability in England 
as in the United States).  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 320. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. Rev. 1267, 1279–95 (1975) 
(suggesting that traditional concepts of "natural justice" require selecting from the following elements: 
unbiased tribunal, notice of proposed action and grounds asserted for it, opportunity to present reasons 
why proposed action should not be taken, right to call witnesses, right to know evidence against one, 
right to have decision based only on evidence presented, right to counsel, making of a record, statement 
of reasons for decision, public attendance, judicial review). 
 321. "[T]he specific dictates of due process generally require consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
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Section 706(2)(D) requires invalidation of agency decisions made 
without an observation of procedures required by law.  The U.S. APA has 
two procedural branches.  A much less demanding branch is applicable to 
quasi legislative decision making, principally rulemaking under Section 
553.  A more demanding branch is applicable to adjudicatory decisions un-
der Section 554 to 558, along with other procedural requirements that may 
be imposed by specific statutes. 
a. Procedural requirements for legislative-type decisions.  Gener-
ally, application of procedural due process concepts to quasi legislative de-
cision making requires notice, a comment period or hearing, and a state-
ment of reasons.322  Section 553 procedures are modeled on legislative 
making procedures customarily used by legislatures,323 basically giving no-
tice of a proposed law (rule), giving interested persons an opportunity to 
comment on the proposal, and then giving some sort of statement justifying 
the measures ultimately adopted, with explicit reference to comments.324  
The procedures are meant to be flexible, to allow ample room for policy 
judgment.  There are manifestly not meant to resemble adjudicatory trial 
procedures which are unsuitable for legislative decision making.325 
Commentators have proposed greater use of notice and comment rule 
making by EU bodies.326  In some cases, the court has been willing to re-
quire EU institutions to consult with experts in order to examine adequately 
factual bases for decisions in complex scientific areas.327 
The same sort of requirements seem appropriate for quasi legislative 
decision making by political trustees.  They should be required to: publish 
proposed regulation and administrative directions, to receive comments on 
 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 322. Verkuil, supra note 228, at 701–02 (explaining convergence of American and English admin-
istrative law). 
 323. See generally Atlanta AG, 1999 E.C.R. at I-7035 (declining to extend right to be heard to leg-
islative proceedings). 
 324. See ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no violation of sec. 
553 requirement to justify rule and to respond to significant comments); Formula v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 
743, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding no violation of APA requirement for agency justification of rule). 
 325. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244–46 (1973) (finding ICC deci-
sion on incentive per diem rates to be subject to sec. 553 rulemaking procedure rather than adjudicatory 
procedure). 
 326. See Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rule Making: A 
Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 451, 479 (1999) (summarizing 
grounds for review of administrative decisions by E.C.J. and citing cases illustrating different grounds). 
 327. Id. at 481 (citing Angelopharm GmbH v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C-212/91, 
1994 E.C.R. I-171, paras. 33–38, at I-211 to I-212). 
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them, and to justify the ultimately adopted regulation or administrative di-
rection.  Of course, as under the APA, emergency measures can be adopted 
without following the procedures, but any agency, including those of po-
litical trustees, should be required to identify the emergency and explain 
why it is necessary to act immediately without time to follow the proce-
dures.328 
b. Procedural requirements for adjudicatory decisions.  Identifying 
the procedural attributes required of adjudicatory decisions involves 
straightforward application of the well known elements of procedural due 
process.329 
First, an impartial decision maker is necessary.  Under the APA these 
now are called “administrative law judges.”  To avoid confusion with the 
regular judiciary, it would be better to revert to former terminology in the 
U.S., and call these “hearing officers.” 
Second, when an agency contemplates official action, it must state the 
reasons for its intended action.  Before withdrawing a privilege or a power, 
for example before canceling a previously existing license, a political trus-
tee should be obligated to give the licensee notice and a brief statement of 
the basis for its inclination to cancel the license. 
Third, the party against whom the agency is acting should be entitled 
to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.  The po-
litical trustee should be required to hear (through the hearing officer) legal 
and factual grounds against its position.  These should be presented in an 
informal context.  The party opposing the political trustee should be enti-
tled to be represented by counsel of the party’s choosing. 
Fourth, the party should be entitled to hear arguments and evidence 
supporting the political trustee’s position.  A political trustee should not be 
entitled to use secret evidence to prevail. 
Fifth, if the facts are in dispute, the party opposing the political trustee 
should be entitled to call witnesses, although the hearing officer should 
have broad discretion to require the presentation of initial testimony in 
written form and to restrict redundant testimony.  But, both the political 
trustee and the party opposing the political trustee should be entitled to 
cross examine witnesses. 
 
 328. See infra Part VII.C.3, for further discussion of emergency decisions. 
 329. The adjudication procedures from the APA requires somewhat more imagination to adapt to 
political trustees because they are much more specific than the rulemaking requirements in Section 553.  
Rather than tracing the specifics of Sections 554–58 it may be better to begin with the elements of for-
mal adjudication, from Judge Friendly's list, see note 320 supra, all of which are incorporated in the 
APA requirements. 
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Sixth, the hearing officer should be obliged to make a preliminary de-
cision based on the evidence in the record, and only that evidence.  Infor-
mal presentations should be summarized in “minutes” of the proceeding, as 
under the Yugoslav Criminal Procedure Code of 1974. 
Seventh, the hearing officer should be obliged to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law supporting his decision. 
Eighth, when the decision goes to the top authority of the political 
trustee for ratification or repudiation, both the initial decision maker and 
the party opposing the decision should be entitled to present arguments in 
writing in support of or in opposition to the hearing officer’s preliminary 
decision. 
c. Classification of cases as legislative or adjudicatory.  Often, the 
most difficult procedural question is whether the flexible procedures of 
quasi legislative decisions apply or whether the formal adjudication proce-
dures apply.  Agencies usually prefer application of the less demanding 
procedures under Section 553, while those opposing agency action usually 
prefer application of the more demanding adjudication procedures because 
they limit the ambit of agency discretion much more.  When the agency is 
found after the fact to have used the wrong procedures, its decision is inva-
lid under Section 706(2)(D). 
The standard distinction characterizes rulemaking (quasi legislative 
decision making) as prospective in application, usually applying to a class 
of persons rather than to a single person and involving questions of law and 
policy and questions of fact that require prediction about the future more 
than a determination about what happened in specific past events.  Legisla-
tion usually requires further procedural steps before it is concretely opera-
tive. 
Adjudication is generally considered to be retrospective in its focus, to 
be applicable to one or a limited number of persons, and to involve applica-
tion of a preexisting rule of law to factual events that already have oc-
curred.  Adjudicatory decisions are usually concretely operative without 
further procedural steps. 
The famous pair of cases in American judicial review jurisprudence, 
Londoner330 and Bi-Metallic Corporation,331 hold that a decision to estab-
lish a tax covering a broad category of taxpayers is legislative in character, 
 
 330. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 386 (due process requires basic elements of hearing before tax can be 
assessed against specific property). 
 331. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445–46 (due process does not require adjudicatory hearing before 
general tax valuation policies are adopted; distinguishing Londoner). 
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while a decision to collect the tax or to assess it concretely against one or a 
limited number of taxpayers is adjudicatory. 
The establishment of a speed limit for the road from Pristina to Skopje 
clearly falls into the rulemaking category.  Determining whether someone 
has violated the speed limit once it is established clearly falls into the adju-
dication category.  Adopting a new criminal code in an UNMIK regulation 
clearly falls into the rulemaking category.  Deciding whether a new law 
passed by the Kosovo Assembly should be invalidated because it violates 
the prohibition against discrimination in UNMIK Regulation 2002/45 
rather clearly falls in the adjudication category. 
Some types of decision are difficult to classify under this framework 
Consider licenses and property rights.  The initial decision whether to grant 
a license enjoys special status under the APA.  It is treated as adjudica-
tion,332 even though initial licensing decisions may involve application of a 
criterion such as “best serves the public interest.”  Adjudicatory procedures 
clearly are appropriate when the licensing decision simply involves appli-
cation of preexisting criteria that are concrete and factually oriented, such 
as a decision whether to issue a drivers license. 
Broad decisions by political trustees about property rights may be leg-
islative in character.  A good example is UNMIK’s Regulation 2002/12, 
establishing the Kosovo Trust Agency and giving it plenary power over all 
property rights associated with public and socially owned enterprises in 
Kosovo.  This regulation imposes substantial limitations on the power of 
municipalities, entities, and individuals in transferring or asserting their 
property rights.  It is accompanied by the prohibition on any conduct that 
might interfere with UNMIK’s power333 similar to the automatic stay in the 
Bankruptcy Act.334 
The fact that this automatic stay makes the UNMIK regulation con-
cretely operative without further procedural steps and its substantial impact 
on property rights would, no doubt, induce most of those with property 
claims to argue that UNMIK could not promulgate it without exhausting 
adjudicatory procedures as to each of them.  But to do so obviously would 
make it impossible to legislate in the property realm with any timeliness. 
The best approach is to extrapolate from Bi-Metallic and treat such a 
broad property regulation like a law imposing a new tax.  It is legislative in 
 
 332. 5 U.S.C. §558(c). 
 333. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 § 29.1 (limiting legal proceedings against enterprises 
subject to KTA control). 
 334. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000); Young v. United States, 543 U.S. 43 (2002) (applying auto-
matic stay to IRS enforcement proceeding). 
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character.  The automatic stay provision should be dealt with by establish-
ing an adjudicatory exceptions procedure, allowing any adversely affected 
person to make application or have the automatic stay lifted.  This should 
mean that an individual with a loan payment due from a socially owned en-
terprise should be allowed to apply to UNMIK for immediate payment of 
the loan, and to have the application handled before a hearing officer.  It 
also means that a socially owned enterprise with a plan for privatization 
that it wants to proceed should have a route to apply to KTA and have the 
application to proceed go before a hearing officer. 
Probably the most difficult category of decisions for procedural classi-
fication involves decisions not to transfer authority to local institutions.  
The policy nature and forward looking character of such decisions qualify 
them to be treated as quasi legislative in character, but a decision not to 
transfer power is simply a maintenance of the status quo, and therefore it 
makes little sense to think in terms of application of a proposed rule not to 
transfer power.  Instead, the way to handle these decisions is to provide a 
mechanism for a local institution that desires a transfer of power to petition 
for that transfer.  Such a petition would trigger a rulemaking proceeding.  
The model is the procedure available under the APA if an agency so pro-
vides, for a person to petition for promulgation of the rule. 
E. Characteristics of the Review Forum 
A variety of institutional arrangements can allow for judicial or a 
quasi judicial review of administrative decisions and conduct, including 
civil courts, criminal courts, employment sanctions by a civil service com-
mission against wayward government officials, ombudsmen, administrative 
courts as in Germany, France, and Austria, and parliamentary oversight.335  
The threshold question on institutional design is whether the review body 
should be a court or some other type of institution.  If it is to be a court, 
questions arise as to where it should be placed in the governmental struc-
ture of the political trustee.  Finally, it is necessary to decide who should 
establish the review body—the U.N. Security Council, the political trustee, 
or someone else. 
1. Ombudsmen and inspection panels.  Courts are not the only type 
of institution that may engage in administrative law review.  Ombudsmen 
and inspection panels are other possibilities.  Ombudsmen tend to use less 
formal investigatory procedures than courts, and most rely on public opin-
 
 335. Robert B. Seidman, Drafting for the Rule of Law: Maintaining Legality in Developing Coun-
tries, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 84, 111–14 (1987). 
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ion and the possibility of action by political institutions to remedy adminis-
trative abuses.336 
Superficially, it might appear that review in regular courts is superior 
to other, apparently more political forms of review.  Ultimately, however, 
the effect to be given to the decision of a reviewing tribunal depends on the 
political will of the executive, acting within the constraints of the applica-
ble legal culture.337  There is no apparent difference between the level of 
compliance with decisions of Article III courts in the United States, admin-
istrative courts in Germany, or the Conseil d’Etat in France, despite the 
placement of the latter entirely within the executive.  Moreover, constitu-
tional courts in Europe are more political in their character, and less judi-
cial, than the regular courts.338  In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel (dis-
tinct from the Conseil d’Etat, which performs administrative review339) 
performs constitutional review.340  The institution is designed to ensure po-
litical and judicial competence: “The Conseil Constitutionnel is a cross be-
tween a political arbiter and a court.  It consists of nine members, ranging 
from politicians to distinguished professors of constitutional law . . . .”341  
Accordingly, it is conceivable that an arrangement not traditionally judicial 
in character could have as much force as more formal judicial arrangements 
for review. 
Practice in Europe and under the political trusteeship in Kosovo pre-
sent models for how ombudsmen might be used for administrative law re-
view in political trusteeships.  The European Ombudsman was established 
by the Maastricht Treaty.  The Ombudsman receives complaints from EU 
citizens or natural or legal persons residing in or having their legal domicile 
in a member state and has jurisdiction to uncover maladministration in the 
community institutions and bodies.  Internal administrative remedies af-
forded by the institution subject to complaint must already have been taken.  
The Ombudsman investigates and informs the institution concerned of its 
 
 336. Koch, supra note 230, at 235–36 (noting English experiment with ombudsmen, with fewer 
powers than Scandinavian ombudsmen). 
 337. See Brian M. Feldman, Evaluating Public Endorsement of the Weak and Strong Forms of Ju-
dicial Supremacy, 89 VA. L. REV. 979, 989 (2003) (noting the possibility that other branches of gov-
ernment might ignore decisions by judiciary; quoting Andrew Jackson: "John Marshall has made his 
decision, now let him enforce it."). 
 338. See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 1445, 1465–66 (2003) (characterizing selection of judges of civil-law constitutional courts as 
more political than selection of judges for regular courts). 
 339. See infra Part VII.E.2. 
 340. Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 379 n.58 (1982) (describing and quoting provisions of French Constitution estab-
lishing constitutional counsel). 
 341. Id. at 388 n.91. 
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conclusions.  The institution has three months to respond to the Ombuds-
man recommendations, and the Ombudsman then submits a report to the 
European Parliament, the institution, and the complainant.342 
The Kosovo Ombudsperson has asserted competency to consider 
complaints against UNMIK.343  For example, the Ombudsperson concluded 
that detention pursuant to UNMIK order contravened European human 
rights law344 and subsequently also found violative of human rights a re-
view commission set up to review the detentions.345  It found no violation 
of human rights in the denial of a radio broadcasting license to an appli-
cant, however.346  It found that a refusal by an UNMIK municipal admini-
stration to register a real property transfer violated human rights stan-
dards.347  The Ombudsperson also found that UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, 
conferring broad immunity on UNMIK and its personnel, violated recog-
nized human rights standards.348 
Inspectors General are another possibility.349  The U.N. Inspector Gen-
eral apparently has authority to review the conduct of U.N.-established 
bodies, including political trustees like UNMIK, but the limited role of this 
office could not plausibly be extended to judicial review in the administra-
tive law sense.  Nevertheless, the establishment and existence of the In-
 
 342. See The European Ombudsman Homepage at http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/home/ 
en/default.htm for basic information on European Ombudsman. 
 343. UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 § 10.1.  See supra text accompanying note 184. 
 344. Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 3, para 8., On the Conformity of 
Deprivations of Liberty under 'Executive Orders' with Recognised International Standards (June 29, 
2001), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/pdf/sr3.pdf. 
 345. Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 4, para. 17, On Certain Aspects of 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/18 on the Establishment of a Detention Review Commission for Extra-
judicial Based on Executive Orders (Sept. 12, 2001), available at  http://www.ombudsperson 
kosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/pdf/sr4.pdf (review commission is not a court, as required by human 
rights law, because not sufficiently independent of executive (SRSG)). 
 346. Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Ex officia Reg. No. 03/01, Regarding the Denial of  a 
Kosovo Wide Broadcasting License to Radio "Kosova e Lirë" (Apr. 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/reps/0003%20Radio%20Kosova%20e%20Lir%EB%20Repo
rt%2027-04-01%20English.doc. 
 347. Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Ex officio Reg. No. 24/2002, para. 3, Regarding the 
Refusal of UNMIK to Register a Contract for the Sale of a Residential Property in Lipjan/Lipljan (Apr. 
22, 2002) (following Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 5, On Certain Aspects of 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/17 on the Registration of Contracts for the Sale of Real Property in 
Specific Geographical Areas of Kosovo (22 August 2001)), available at 
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/reps/Sadiku%20Report%20final%20 
English%20version%2020%20April%202002.doc. 
 348. See supra text accompanying note 185. 
 349. See generally Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452 § 11, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) 
(establishing Offices of Inspector General within the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Housing 
and Urban Development, the Interior, Labor, and Transportation, and other agencies). 
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spector General is another example of how a non-judicial body with admin-
istrative law review power could be set up.  The World Bank created a 
three-member “inspection panel” in 1993 to investigate claims by private 
citizens that their interests are harmed by a bank project undertaken or im-
plemented in violation of bank policies and procedures.350  The inspection 
panel has received 27 formal requests since it began operations in Septem-
ber 1994.351 
Thus designing future political trusteeships to afford administrative 
law review is not limited to providing for judicial review in a judiciary; it 
also could provide for review by ombudsmen or inspectors general. 
2. Courts and the “administration”: separation of powers.  Assum-
ing that judicial bodies are best suited to perform administrative law re-
view, those courts can be part of an independent judiciary, or they can be 
part of the “administration”—the executive branch.  “Separation of pow-
ers” can be misleading as a goal in structuring governments.  The execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of government are not independent 
sovereigns; they exercise different types of power in a single, undivided 
sovereign.  The authority of federal courts derives from the same source as 
the authority of the U.S. Congress—the U.S. Constitution, expressing the 
will of the people—or at least of the states—making up the sovereign 
United States.  Indeed the Constitution leaves to the legislative branch most 
of the details of the establishment and structure of the judicial branch.352 
A sovereign can establish one institution to review and to monitor the 
activities of another institution established by the same sovereign.  In some 
legal systems, the bodies with judicial review authority are distinct from 
the regular courts and are more obviously part of the administration.  The 
French Conseil d’Etat is the classic example.353  The Conseil d’Etat is at the 
pinnacle of the French system of administrative courts, separate from the 
regular criminal and civil courts.354  It was established by Napoleon in 
1799,355 and is presided over by the Prime Minister of France and managed, 
 
 350. See The Inspection Panel—Overview, WORLD BANK GROUP, available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf/WOverview/overview?opendocument (last visited Oct. 
18, 2004). 
 351. Id. 
 352. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . . in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). 
 353. See infra notes 354–357 and accompanying text. 
 354. See Aucoin, supra note at 204, at 461–62 (briefly describing French administrative courts); 
Kublicki, supra note 209, at 67–75 (more detailed description of different levels and competencies of 
French administrative courts). 
 355. Kublicki, supra note 209, at 70. 
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day to day, by the Minister of Justice.356  Placement of the highest court for 
judicial review of administrative action reflects historical French suspicion 
of regular courts as antidemocratic.357 
In the United States, the congressionally established Tax Court, the 
archetypal “legislative court,” reviews the decisions of another congres-
sionally established institution, the Internal Revenue Service.  Such “Arti-
cle I courts” occupy a position similar to that of the Conseil d’Etat in 
France.  Under American law, “Article I courts”358 and administrative bod-
ies359 may “adjudicate any case involving public rights.”360  In the United 
States, some administrative law review bodies are administrative agencies 
rather than Article I or Article III courts.  The Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission is a good example.361 
In France, as in Germany, the institutional responsibility for review of 
administrative decisions is separated from institutional responsibility for 
reviewing legislation for its constitutionality. 
The burden on independent institutions to review administrative deci-
sions can be reduced by establishing a system of independent review tribu-
nals providing a kind of administrative appeal.362  Initial adjudicatory deci-
sions by ALJs, followed by review in an administrative appeals body, and 
followed in exceptional cases by review by the top authority of a political 
trustee, can produce a crisper review in most cases, while still allowing the 
 
 356. Id. at 71. 
 357. Aucoin, supra note at 204, at 447 (describing hostility to "government des juges"—
government by judges). 
 358. "Article I" courts are judicial bodies established by the Congress, such as the Tax Court, the 
United States Claims Court, the Court of Veterans Appeals, and the Bankruptcy Courts, which lack one 
or more attributes of Article III courts, such as life tenure of judges. 
 359. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 
(1977) ("when Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an ad-
ministrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh 
Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law'"). 
 360. Crude Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 923 F. Supp. 222, 234 (D.D.C. 1996) (Energy 
Department Office of Hearings and Appeals could adjudicate dispute over compliance with crude oil 
allocation rules).  "Public rights" cases are those "in which the Government is sued in its sovereign ca-
pacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact."  Id. at 234. 
 361. See Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 445–46 (describing the review process).  Under the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657, the Secretary of Labor conducts inspections to deter-
mine compliance with health and safety standards.  Id.  If the inspector issues a citation, the employer 
may request an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge of the independent Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission.  Id.  A decision by the ALJ can be reviewed by the full 
Commission.  Id. 
 362. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2004) (establishing Board of Immigration Appeals within Department 
of Justice); 20 C.F.R. § 422.205 (2004) (providing for appeals to "Appeals Council" within Social Secu-
rity Administration); Koch, supra note 230, at 248–49 (noting trend in England and United States to 
establish administrative appeals bodies). 
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top-level political trustee to take into account policy dimensions when he 
decides whether or not to give effect to a review decision. 
3. Who should establish the review bodies?  Administrative law re-
view bodies with competence to review decisions by political trustees can 
be established by the political trustee itself or by the U.N. Security Coun-
cil.363  The U.N. Security Council could establish a judicial—or other—
body364 to review decisions of U.N.-established political trustee, or all such 
political trustees.  This approach would be problematic when the basic au-
thority for the political trusteeship is not a U.N. Security Council resolu-
tion, as in Kosovo or East Timor, but retained sovereignty in local institu-
tions as in Bosnia and Afghanistan, or military occupation as in Iraq 
Alternatively a future political trustee could establish a tribunal to re-
view the actions of subordinate officials of the trustee. 365  This could take 
the form of an ombudsman or a specialized court reporting to the top-level 
authority of the political trustee.  Under U.S. administrative law, the heads 
of agencies establish independent bodies within the agency to review the 
decisions of other bodies within the same agency.  Administrative law 
judges366 and inspectors general, are examples.367  The highest-level author-
ity of the trustee, like an administrative agency head, would have ultimate 
power to accept or to reject decisions of the reviewing body.368 
 
 363. Of course, merely establishing an administrative law review body for political trustee deci-
sions does not exclude the possibility of review in other forums, except under comity doctrines such as 
forum non conveniens.  See Jenny S. Martinez, Towards and International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 429, 478 (2003) (considering interaction of national and international judicial and political bodies 
along six axes); see supra Part III.A.4 (discussing forum non conveniens doctrine). 
 364. It is generally—though not universally—accepted that the Security Council has the power to 
establish judicial bodies, such as the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.  See 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
IT-94-1, para. 20–40 (Aug. 10, 1995) (reviewing legitimacy of Security Council decision creating it), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895.htm. 
 365. The Special Chamber, established by UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 is a good example. 
 366. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372. 
 367. Often, ALJs and inspectors general are mandated by statute, but not always.  In any event the 
details of their existence inevitably is established by rules issued by the agency head within which they 
function.  For example, the Federal Aviation Administrator established administrative law judges and 
review mechanisms with power to review decisions of subordinate officials.  See 49 U.S.C. § 
106(f)(3)(A) (2000) (granting rulemaking authority to Administrator of the FAA); id. § 46102(a) (au-
thorizing FAA Administrator to conduct investigation and enforcement proceedings "in a way condu-
cive to justice and the proper dispatch of business"); 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(h) (2004) (providing for appeal 
of ALJ decision on civil penalty to Administrator of FAA). 
 368. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (allowing for initial or recommended decision by ALJ, subject to discre-
tional review by the "agency"). 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Legitimacy of political trusteeships can be enhanced by providing for 
judicial review of decisions by administrative agencies established as part 
of the political trusteeship civil administration.  Moreover, establishing ju-
dicial review mechanisms can reduce the likelihood of litigation over po-
litical trustee decisions in national courts.  Models for military occupation 
are inadequate.  Designers of future international interventions should 
adapt from models provided by judicial review of administrative agency 
decisions in the European Union, France, Germany, Britain, and the United 
States to establish mechanisms for “administrative law review,” providing 
exemptions for major political decisions purely military decisions and for 
emergency action.  Other types of decisions should be subject to review for 
compliance with higher-level authority, for rationality and for procedural 
regularity.  The review can be accomplished in judicial bodies established 
by the U.N. Security Council or by the political trustee itself.  Review also 
may be available through non-judicial bodies such as ombudsmen and in-
spection panels. 
